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ABSTRACT 
This research is about the underlying mechanism which contributes to urban-
rural inequality in post-reform China. A new concept called "Geographic 
Transfer of Resource" (GTR) is introduced to denote this mechanism. It is 
established upon the inherent features of the planned economy and the 
socialist state, namely the economic tendency of resource constraint and 
underproduction and the political tendency of state control. The concept is 
discussed and elaborated under both the realist prespective of causal 
mechanisms and of spatial context. For the former, we argue that the GTR 
mechanism is systemic in nature. The strategy of priority growth and the GTR 
mechanism are the outcomes of this system. The direct result of the GTR 
mechanism is an inter-regional transfer of resources. Economic refrom has not 
altered the structure of this system and resource transfer is thus still in 
operation. For the latter, the system of city-leading-counties is highlighted 
together with its effects on the operation of GTR. There are two arguments: 
(1) The institutional reform of city-leading-counties has altered the 
relationships and interactions between the urban area and the rural area, and 
increased the number of channels for resource transfer. These developments 
have contributed to a "dual transfer" of rural resources. (2) Institutional 
� reform also contributes to the localization of GTR. This includes two folds of 
meaning. First, the GTR apparatuses are localized and controlled by the local 
governments. Second, there is an increasing amount of resources retained for 
local development. Local governments, in fact, have replaced the role 
formerly played the State. 
i 
The way the GTR and resource transfer operate is illustrated in the 
context of the Sunan Area, one of the most wealthy and developed regions in 
China. The socio-economic characteristics of the "Sunan Model" and its 
impacts on the GTR mechanism are clarified and elaborated. Our study shows 
that GTR and resource transfer in the Sunan Area are greatly affected by its 
locality effects. The close relationship between the rural industries and the 
agricultural activities has induced an additional channel of resource transfer 
before the leakage of resources out of the rural areas: an intra-regional flow. 
Finally, while the price mechanism represents the dominant channel of 
resource transfer, various government taxes and payments also play an 
important role. For the former, our estimation shows that from the mid 80s to 
the early 90s, the leading cities have benefited most from the resource 
transfer, while their led cities and counties have suffered from resource loss. 
For the latter, a total of 27 items of exborbitant payment has been identified in 
the study area. This is only the tip of an iceberg, however, because different 
counties and cities may suffer from different forms of exorbitant levies. 
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1.1 Setting the Scene 
This research is about the forces underlying urban-rural disparity in post-
reform China. Economic reform since 1979 has brought apparent changes to 
both the urban and the rural landscapes. In the urban areas, we have 
experienced the introduction of reform measures to promote entrepreneurship 
in the production sector and to form markets in capital, labour and land. The 
standard of living of urbanites has been raised with the resurgence of the 
service sector and the substantive increase in house building activities. 
According to Fan (1994:20), the per capita consumption income (xiaofeixing 
shouruy of urban residents was RMB 2485.18 yuan in 1992, or a 2.67 times 
increase from those in 1985. In terms of economic performance, the gross 
value of industrial output had grown at an average annual rate of 12% and 
13.2% over the periods of 1980-85 and 1986-90, respectively (Guojia 
Tongjiju 1992:49). 
Parallel changes seem to be taking place in the rural areas. We have 
observed the adoption of the household responsibility system, the raise in 
agricultural purchasing prices, the institutionalization of rural markets, the 
freer transfer of rural surplus labour, the re-establishment of rural-urban 
1 Consumption income refers to those incomes which are directly used for 
consumption (of consumer goods), savings and other non-productive expenditures in 
housing, medical treatment and welfare services. For the urban resident's 
consumption income, both cash income and "hidden" income (government subsides 
in housing, medical services and insurance etc.) are included. 
interaction, the encouragement of rural industrialization and the rapid 
development of small towns. According to Xu et al (1987:47), the average 
annual growth rate of township population from 1978 to 1983 was 3.68%, 
while the annual population growth rate of the country as a whole was 1.26% 
only. The number of designated town (jianzhi zhen) had increased from 2,854 
in 1979 to 14,458 in 1992 (Xie 1994:53). Over the period of 1980-90, the 
gross value of industrial output of township and village industries had 
increased from RMB 54.4 billion to RMB 672 billion (Guojia Tongjiju 
1992:327). The latter accounted for 28% of the country's gross value of 
industrial output. Also about 100 million rural surplus labour had been 
absorbed by these enterprises (Xie 1994:54). 
Recent studies, however, show that the rural areas have not really 
benefited from these reform measures as expected. Increase in production cost 
has wiped out the gains accrued from the raise in purchasing price and has 
imperceptibly reduced the peasant's income. Intra-rural inequality has 
expanded rapidly, and income inequality between the rural and the urban is 
still existing (see Lo 1990，Khan et al 1992, 1993, Tsui 1993, Oi 1993, Fan 
1994). For instance, the ratio of urban-rural per capita consumption income in 
1992 was 3.34:1, which is 1.35 times higher than the 1985 ratio (Fan 
1994:20). In 1992, the per capita income (net income) in the rural areas was 
� R M B 431.77 - same as that in the urban areas in 1980. The ratio of urban-
rural per capita purchasing power in the latter year was 6:1 (Fan 1994:21). 
Furthermore, the agricultural sector still suffers from resource extraction from 
the industrial sector (Sheng 1993a, 1993b, Oi 1993). Scissors differential 
(jiandaocha) has been widened again in the recent years (1986-1990) (for 
instance, Xiao 1993, Han 1994). This is contributed by the expansion of the 
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pricing gap between industrial and agricultural commodities. During the 
seventh Five Year Plan (FYP) (1986-1990), an increase by a factor of 5.87 
was recorded in the general retail price index of industrial commodities 
{gongyepin lingshoujia zongzhishu), while only a factor of 2.97 was recorded 
in the State's procurement price (Xiao 1993:39). During the first six months of 
1993, the prices of agricultural production factors (such as fertilizer, 
agricultural chemicals and seeds) had increased 16.5%, while less than 6% 
increase was recorded in State's procurement price (Han 1994:10). All of 
these have inevitably decreased the living standard of the peasants. Therefore, 
it seems that economic reforms have made too little contribution to reduce 
urban-rural disparity in China. Why is it the case? What are the underlying 
causes? 
1.2 The Research Problem 
In China, the issue of urban-rural relationship has received prominent 
attention for a long time. This is partly due to the peasant origin of the 
Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) revolution and Mao Zedong's peasant root. 
As early as during the civil war period, Mao Zedong had proclaimed that one 
of the major jobs of the CCP was to gradually eliminate the "three major 
�dis t inct ions" {san dai chabie) of urban-rural inequality, industry-agriculture 
inequality and inequality between physical and mental labour. Urban-rural 
inequality is the most significant among them. It is because the huge rural 
population (that accounted for 72.4% of total population in 1991 (Guojia 
Tongjiju 1993:81)) has made the issue the immediate problem of the country. 
According to Mao, one of the prime targets of economic development in post-
3 
war China was to eliminate the urban-rural gap. Moreover, unification of the 
urban and the rural {chengxiang yitihua) is the socialist ideal that most 
Chinese leaders - supposedly adherence of socialism - have dreamt of. If this 
is the case, it becomes a puzzle to everyone that urban-rural disparity has 
persisted over time. 
The literature on China's urban-rural relationships is not that 
informative. First of all, unlike the inter-provincial or coastal/inland level, 
very few studies have focused on the urban-rural dimension. For those 
focusing on this dimension, most of them are concerned with the situation 
during Mao's period (1949-78). Study on the post-reform period is rare. 
Concomitantly, investigating the forces that account for the persistence of 
urban-rural disparity in post-reform China is a meaningful research problem. 
In particular, we are interested in the possible changes in urban-rural disparity 
induced by the institutionalization of the regional administration system of 
city-leading-counties {shiguanxian) in 1982. The latter represents a change in 
the relationship between the State and some local governments. While some 
counties and cities and towns were formerly subordinated to the prefectures, 
they are now under the auspices of the leading city governments. This 
administrative change therefore implies a modification of the relationships 
between the urban and the rural. 
In fact, the system of city-leading-counties is not a new phenomenon in 
China. Early in 1959, the system was passed legally by the National People's 
Congress. During 1960, 48 cities had adopted the new system and a total of 
234 counties were led (Wang 1992:26). The system was abolished in 1961, 
when most of those leading cities were replaced by the prefecture agencies 
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�diqu xingchu). In 1965, there were only 24 cities in the system, leading 78 
counties. 
The system was reproposed during the fifth meeting of People's 
Congress in November 1982. The then premier Zhao Ziyang suggested to 
reform the regional administrative system to facilitate the economic reform. In 
particular, the State was to adopt the system of city-leading-counties in 
prosperous regions. Jiangsu, the most prosperous region in China, was the 
first province to implement this system. Until 1990, 170 cities had adopted the 
new system and led 708 counties (Wang 1992:27). 
The administrative reform of city-leading-counties is to institutionalize 
the city as the administrative agency that manages a certain number of 
counties, formerly under the province or the prefecture agency. The leading 
city is a level of local government. It enjoys absolute power within its leading 
jurisdiction. Institutionally, it functions as a city manager and local 
government (Diao 1989:169). Economically, it enforces the central place 
function of cities that benefits urban development. According to Zhao's (1982) 
speech in the National People's Congress, the objective of city-leading-
counties is to "bring the large and medium cities into full play in the 
management of economic activities", so that cities function as a central place 
and "bring along rural development, unify the composition in the sphere of 
production and circulation, so that various economic zones supported by the 
cities can be formed" (translation mine). In short, the new system was meant 
to eliminate the prolonged isolation between the rural and the urban. 
It is necessary to clarify the concept of "city" in order to appreciate the 
implications of such administrative change on urban-rural relationship. In 
5 
China, "city" (shi) has several definitions. It can be defined by its population 
size, its position in the administrative hierarchy or its nature. In the Chinese 
administrative hierarchy, there are state-administered municipalities (zixiashi), 
prefecture-level cities (dijishi) and county-level cities (xianjishi). 
Municipalities, which occupy the same level of hierarchy as provinces (sheng) 
and autonomous regions (zizhiqu), are directly controlled by the State. 
Prefecture-level cities are administratively located between provinces and 
counties (xian), and governed by provincial government or autonomous 
regions. Finally, county-level cities belong to the same administrative level as 
the counties. 
Only the prefecture-level cities are allowed to lead counties and 
county-level cities. Thus cities under the system of city-leading-counties may 
refer to different types of social organization. In the broadest sense, a city 
refers the prefecture-level city and her led counties and county-level cities, 
while in the narrowest sense, a city refers to the prefecture-level city only. To 
avoid confusion in our later analysis, the term "LC" is used to denote city in 
the former sense and "City" (with capital letter) with the latter. County-level 
city will be referred to as "city" to differentiate it from its prefecture 
counterpart. To illustrate, Wuxi City refers to the Wuxi prefecture-level city, 
while Wuxi LC refers to the administrative unit comprising the Wuxi City, 
� W u x i county and Yixing city. Finally, in discussing the system of city-
leading-counties, the term "leading city" will be used to denote the prefecture-
level city with its subordinated counties. 
To summarize, the system of city-leading-counties has reshuffled the 
relations of subordination for many counties and cities, on the one hand, and 
enlarged the power of influence of some prefecture-level cities, on the other. 
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This has in turn complicated the formerly quite clear-cut demarcation between 
the urban and the rural. In the past, counties belonged to the rural, while cities 
belonged the urban. Under the new system, since there are both cities and 
counties within a LC, we are talking about the ruralization of the urban as well 
as the urbanization of the rural. It is then not exaggerating to remark that 
urban-rural interaction in China has entered a new era with the 
implementation of the administrative system of city-leading-counties. Is this 
new system in any way responsible for the observable perpetuation of urban-
rural disparity in post-reform China? In what way has the former caused the 
latter? 
1.3 Research Objective 
It is the objective of this research to explain how the system of city-leading-
counties has influenced the ways in which the urban and the rural interact and 
thus their relationships. This is to be achieved by, first, investigating the 
underlying mechanism that contributes to the perpetuation of urban-rural 
disparity in China. A new concept called "Geographic Transfer of Resources" 
(GTR) will be introduced to denote this mechanism. The way GTR actually 
operates is then illustrated within the spatial contingent context of the Sunan 
� A r e a . Not only will the details of the operation of this mechanism be clarified 
and elaborated in conceptual terms, but also will it be illustrated in numerical 
terms. In the end, we shall be told not only how but also in what magnitude 
have resources in rural Sunan been transferred to the urban areas. 
It is necessary to spell out the rationale behind the choice of the Sunan 
Area as an illustration. First, it is the most wealthy region in the Jiangsu 
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province as well as in North-eastern China. Geographical proximity to the 
Shanghai Municipality had contributed to its rapid development in rural 
industries. The latter has been considered the prime motor of rural 
development during the post-reform period. Thus by focusing on the 
experience of a region with rapid industrialization, we are in a better position 
to understand the operation of GTR in a local context. Second, Jiangsu , in 
which the Sunan Area is located, is the first province that implemented the 
system of city-leading-counties dated back to 1982. In other words, it is more 
informative to investigate the pioneer and longer experience of the Sunan 
Area than other provinces with shorter periods of implementation. In sum, we 
consider the Sunan Area as the ideal choice for our objective. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
The concept of GTR is constructed by reviewing the literature. The literature 
review includes theories and arguments of urban-rural disparity in both China 
and developing countries in general. It focuses on the structural forces 
affecting the formation of causal mechanism rather than on the superficial 
discussion of the indicators of disparity. GTR is operationalized by translating 
it into simple accounting formulae. The types and amounts of resources 
� t ransferred in and out of any region are identified and enumerated. It is then 
possible to draw a conclusion from these data that a particular rural region has 
lost so much resources to an urban region or vice versa. 
Information regarding the Sunan Area is obtained from both library 
research and field trips. Two trips were made for this purpose, one from 12 to 
20 June 1993 and the other from 1 to 13 Oct., 1993. During these trips, 
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relevant officials were interviewed to clarify the exact way in which resources 
from the rural are expropriated and then reallocated within a region. Besides, 
statistical data, mostly unknown to people outside the region, were collected. 
They are used to fit into the formulae mentioned above to specify the 
allocation of resources over space. 
1.5 Significance of this Research 
It is apparent from the above that this research will make a modest 
contribution to our understanding of the mechanism causing the continual 
urban-rural disparity in post-reform China. Besides, it will enrich the literature 
on regional uneven development in China. This literature started with the 
Lardy-Donnithome dispute whether or not the State was in the central position 
to reduce regional disparity. Lately, the literature is flooded with research 
examining disparities across regions (either east/center/west or inter-province) 
(see Lo 1990, Pannell 1987，Tsui 1991). While Tang (1991) disputes this 
regional demarcation and proposes to examine inter-provincial disparities, 
Tsui (1993), among others, concludes that the urban-rural dimension may be 
one of the most important sources of disparity. This research, which focuses 
on this dimension, therefore represents not only a supplement to the literature 
� b u t also a new direction for research. Furthermore, this study enriches the 
literature on uneven development in other socialist countries. By focusing on 
the intrinsic characteristics of the planned economy and the socialist state, this 
research may also provide pointers for research into uneven development of 
other socialist countries. This also has practical implications, because many 
countries of this camp are undergoing transformation. China's experience with 
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regional administrative reform may provide a lesson for other countries. 
Finally，the concepts constructed in this research, such as the GTR and 
insights on urban-rural disparity, may encourage more discussion even in the 
development literature in general. 
1.6 Organization of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follow. Chapter 2 concentrates on a 
review of both Chinese-language and English-language literature on urban-
rural inequality. In this review, problems of the existing literature are exposed, 
and the theoretical concepts of the mechanisms which contribute to regional 
inequality are analyzed. This lays down the groundwork for a more 
informative concept of urban-rural inequality in China. Chapter 3 focuses on 
the formulation of the concept of GTR. The discussion is divided into two 
parts: first on the causal mechanism itself and, second, on the way it operates 
in a spatial context. In the former, GTR and its operations will be discussed in 
the light of the political and economic structural characteristics of China. In 
the latter, regional administrative reform of city-leading-counties will be 
highlighted together with its effect on the operation of GTR. This allows for a 
deeper understanding of the mechanisms of resource transfer. Chapter 4 deals 
� w i t h the operation of the concept. Simple mathematical formulae will be 
derived to estimate the amount of resource transfers under the mechanism of 
GTR. Some technical problems will also be outlined. Chapter 5 outlines the 
basic socio-economic characteristics of the Sunan Area. These characteristics 
act as a spatial contingent effect on the operation of GTR. Thus this 
description offers the background to understand the spatial difference in the 
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impacts of GTR between the Sunan Area and other parts of China. Chapter 6 
provides some quantitative evidences on resource transfer, while Chapter 7 
discusses these evidences on the grounds of the characteristics of the Sunan 
Area. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the above arguments and suggests 
pointers for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN THE URBAN AND THE 
RURAL: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to review the literature on urban-rural 
inequality. The literature includes previous studies on the issue and western 
ideas on the structural forces underlying the formation of inequality. For the 
former, they can be roughly sub-divided into two categories: one on the role 
of the labour theory of value to explain scissors differential and the other on 
the Soviet development strategy. For the literature that focuses on the 
formation of inequality, only neo-classical economic theories, unequal 
exchange and urban-bias will be outlined. Their applicability to the issue of 
urban-rural inequality in China will also be discussed. 
2.2. The Literature on Urban-rural Inequality in China 
Most of the Chinese-language literature is dominated by the discussions on 
"scissors differential (or scissors pricing)" (jiandaocha) between agricultural 
and industrial products. This economic measure, the direct consequence of 
adopting a development strategy of priority growth (Gao & Xiang 1992:212), 
is considered as the ultimate cause of urban-rural inequality (see Gao & Xiang 
1992, Han 1994, Li 1981，Shi 1983, Xiao 1993, Yan et al. 1988, 1990). 
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In China, scissors differential is operated along with a number of other 
policies such as the compulsory procurement of agricultural products, the 
mono-channel of commodity exchange and the restriction of rural-urban 
migration. According to Gao & Xiang (1992:199-202), scissors differential 
has two definitions: scissors differential in price {bijia jiandaocha) and 
scissors differential in value {bizhi jiandaocha). The former refers to the price 
differential between agricultural and industrial products, while the latter refers 
to the deviation of prices (both agricultural and industrial products) from their 
values. In most of the cases, the prices of industrial commodities are above 
their values, whereas those of agricultural commodities are below their values. 
Disregarding the definition adopted, scissors differential amounts to an 
unequal exchange between industrial and agricultural commodities on an 
intentional basis. Rural resources are thus siphoned off from the agricultural 
sector to the industrial sector. The final outcome is nothing but the urban-rural 
divergence. 
It is Li (1981) who provides a more conceptual treatment of the 
concept of scissors differential. He defines scissors differential as the 
"deviation of prices from their values (for both industrial and agricultural 
commodities)". Labour value, which is the socially necessary labour time 
embodied to produce a commodity, is used to define the value of a commodity 
� a n d employed to estimate the scissors differential. Yan et al (1988, 1990) 
operationalize Li's concept by specifying labour value as the comparable 
labour force {kebi laodongli), or the difference in the length and expenses of 
education between agricultural and non-agricultural labourers. 
It is difficult to deny the contribution of Li and Yan et al to the study 
of scissors differential, but their works have remained unsatisfactory. Their 
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description of scissors differential is still superficial, and so is that of urban-
rural inequality. In fact, this problem also applies to other studies on scissors 
differential. Discussions usually focus on whether the scissors differential 
exists, its formation, its measurement and its contributions to inter-sectoral 
resource transfer (see Han 1994, Liu 1992, Shi 1983, Xiao 1993, Zhou 1994). 
The underlying causes that produce the phenomenon have seldom been 
addressed. 
Moreover, the way scissors differential is interpreted as the cause of 
China's urban-rural inequality is not without problems. Scissors differential 
represents only one kind of unequal exchange via the price mechanism. 
Resources can be transferred via other non-price channels, which have 
nothing to do with the scissors differential. Besides, the significance of 
scissors differential on urban-rural divergence is decreased during the era of 
economic reform. During the pre-reform period, both the urban and the rural 
areas were functionally cut off by the administrative system, with the urban 
areas being dominated by industrial activities and the rural areas by 
agricultural activities. It is in this setting that the contribution of scissors 
differential may be more significant. However, economic reform has altered 
this setting. There are now non-agricultural activities as well as channels for 
exchange other than the State market in the rural areas. Meanwhile, new 
�mechanisms installed during this period will also contribute to the urban-rural 
divergence. Thus, the significance of scissors differential on urban-rural 
inequality will be decreased. 
In the Chinese-language literature, the concept of dual social structure 
has also been employed to capture the urban-rural relationships (Guo & Liu 
1990). Starting with a dual economy, the functional separation between 
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agriculture and industry in China, Guo & Liu (1990) argue, soon developed 
into a dual social structure: in addition to the dual economy, there was also 
separation between the urban and the rural societies. The dual social structure 
was fossilized by the interplay of 14 irrational policy measures (Guo and Liu 
1990:1), including household registration, housing allocation, grain rationing, 
foodstuff and fuel rationing, factors of production allocation, educational 
services, medical services, pension and social insurance, marriage system, 
labour safety system, human resources, subscription and employment 
allocation. These 14 institutions were responsible for prohibiting the 
integration of the urban and the rural and, in turn, perpetrating the 
development of the dual social structure of an urban society and a rural 
society (Guo and Liu 1990:7-8). 
Guo and Liu's (1990) analysis represents a relatively complete picture 
of China's urban-rural relationships. However, the framework of a dual social 
structure has over-simplified the reality in post-reform China. More and more 
evidences show that a transitional zone, comprising both the characteristics of 
the urban and the rural, has appeared�. This implies that the traditional dual 
structure (of urban-rural) is going to be replaced by a triple structure of urban-
suburban-rural. Undoubtedly, most characteristics of the dual structure are 
still active in affecting the interaction between the urban and the rural, 
�however , a more extensive framework is required to capture the new 
development. 
There are problems with the English-language literature too. Most 
studies have relied on the Soviet model of development strategy and the 
2 This may take the form of, say, McGee's (1987) ”kotadesasi” or Bao's (1991) 
suburban economy (chengjiao jingji). 
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household registration system as the main reasons behind the uneven 
development between the urban and the rural (e.g. Cannon 1990, Lo 1990， 
Perkins & Yusuf 1984, Riskin 1984, 1990, Yang 1990). The best treatise of 
this kind can be found in Chan (1992). Under the Soviet growth strategy, 
Chan (1992:275-6) argues, China had adopted a priority growth in heavy 
industries and attempted to maximize her output through high accumulation. 
In order to maximize industrialization and minimize the production cost, anti-
urbanization policies were adopted. The objective of these policies is to 
"economize" the costs of urbanization without affecting industrialization 
negatively (Chan 1992:300). The measures included a tight control of rural-
urban migration, the fully utilization of the existing urban working population, 
the suppression of urban worker's income and consumption, as well as the 
expansion of the urban service sector. All these measures had not only 
contributed to the perpetration of urban-rural inequality, but also reinforced 
the isolation between the urban and the rural areas. 
This framework has provided an useful explanation for the urban-rural 
relationship in Mao's period. However, it is insufficient to explain the 
situation after 1979. As a matter of fact, most of the current English-language 
literature has focused on Mao's period. Accordingly, the impacts of economic 
reform on the issue have been poorly researched. 
Perhaps Zweig's (1987) study represents the most comprehensive 
attempt to make up this problem. He argues that the resurgence of rural 
markets, the rapid development of rural factories, the more relaxed attitude 
and policy towards rural-urban labour migration, the development of rural 
small towns, the expansion of the tertiary sector and the transfer of technology 
to the countryside have increased the urban-rural interaction and eventually 
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narrowed the urban-rural gap. His conclusion, which is based on both the 
World Bank's (1985) and China's official data of average income growth rate, 
average expenses and consumption rate, is only valid in terms of income 
calculations. It is because these two sets of data cover only the period from 
1979 to 1984, the first few years immediately after the economic reform. 
During this period, with a lower base of family income in the rural areas to 
start with, it is normal to expect a higher growth rate for the rural than for the 
urban. But this does not mean that the urban-rural income differential had 
been narrowed. Besides, since the rapid increase in the peasant's expenses and 
consumption may represent the peasants' reactions after a prolonged period of 
economic stagnation, the smaller urban-rural differential may be an illusion. 
Thus, it is too early for Zweig (1987:43) to conclude that economic reform 
had helped to narrow the urban-rural gap. 
One can challenge not only the time frame but also the statistical 
yardstick chosen by Zweig. Based on a relatively comprehensive database for 
1988, Tsui (1993) has come to a conclusion that is completely different from 
Zweig's (1987). Tsui (1993:601) uses the per capita gross value of industrial 
and agricultural output (GVIAO), the infant mortality rate (IMR) and the 
illiteracy and semi-illiteracy rate (ILR) to estimate the urban-rural inequality 
and its contribution to the overall regional inequality in China. His findings 
� s h o w that when the per capita GVIAO is employed, urban-rural inequality 
contributes to 52% of China's overall regional inequality. However, the 
contributions by IMR and ILR are 8% and 24%, respectively (Tsui 1993:617). 
His work has illustrated vividly that the level of urban-rural inequality 
depends on the choice of statistical yardstick. It also proves persuasively that 
urban-rural inequality, which plays an important role in contributing to other 
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dimensions of regional inequality, is still severe (especially under the 
GVIAO). 
Tang (1993) has highlighted another defect in the English-language 
literature: failure to address the structural forces. This applies to different 
perspectives of urbanization - be they "anti-urbanism", "class struggle" and 
"economic imperative". While the "anti-urbanism" perspective has focused on 
the study of policies, it fails to put them within the contexts of the economy 
and of the State. While the "class struggle" perspective sees class struggle as a 
major determinant, it fails to realize that it is difficult to delineate a class 
responsible for the observable urban outcomes. Finally, while the "economic 
imperative" perspective has emphasized the development strategy, it fails to 
take note of other, basically, non-economic policies of the socialist state. In 
other words, a better-informed theory of the state is imperative to any 
understanding of urban change. 
Another defect identified by Tang (1993) is the failure to pay due 
attention to spatial relations. The latter include the spatial contingent effect, 
the spatial boundary effect and the locality effect. As stated by Tang 
(1993:39), the spatial contingent effect refers to the fact that "while spatial 
relations are constituted by social and natural objects with inherent causal 
powers, they are not reduced to their constituents". The spatial boundary 
effect is the locally specific causal social mechanism. The basic difference 
between the spatial contingent effect and the spatial boundary effect is that the 
former "effects how changes occur", while the latter "causes changes to 
happen" (Tang 1993:40). Finally, the locality effect is the influence of both 
spatial contingent effect and spatial boundary effect to a particular place. 
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Although his study focuses on urbanization, it is not difficult to extend his 
finding to, what matters us here, the urban-rural interactions and relationships. 
The literature on urban-rural inequality has not addressed these 
relations. Most of the previous studies have emphasized the impacts of the 
Soviet development strategy on urban-rural inequality. At best, they have 
captured the structural forces; but certainly they have ignored these spatial 
effects. The way in which the urban and the rural interact under the new 
regional administrative system will undoubtedly affect the operation of these 
structural forces; spatial contingent relations do matter. Similarly, variations 
in urban-rural interaction can be found between regions that implement city-
leading-counties and those do not. This is because there are causal 
mechanisms specific to the former regions but not the latter. Finally, we may 
expect mechanisms originated from some of the more prosperous regions to 
shape national policies. Thus, it is not exaggerating to remark that the existing 
literature, which has downplayed the role of spatial relations in explaining 
urban-rural inequality, is still wanting. 
In sum, three problems of the current literature on Chinese urban-rural 
inequality have been identified. The first limitation relates to the study period. 
A considerable amount of the literature has concentrated on the Mao's period, 
while very few studies are on the post-reform period. Secondly, most of the 
literature is concerned with describing the impacts of development strategy on 
urban-rural inequality, or estimating their statistical evidences. The underlying 
mechanisms which contribute to the inequality are, however, poorly 
researched. Thirdly, the literature usually understands the problem of urban-
rural inequality in terms of "anti-urbanism", "class struggle" or "economic 
perspective". The spatial elements have been ignored. 
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2.3. Urban-Rural Inequality: a Discussion of Western Concepts 
As mentioned above, one of the inadequacies of the existing literature on 
Chinese urban-rural inequality is their emphasis on superficial description of 
the phenomenon, rather than interpretation of the underlying mechanisms. The 
objective of this section is to review the applicability of some western 
concepts to the improvement of this problem. Discussion will focus on the 
theories of unequal exchange and of urban bias. The ways these theories 
explain the underlying tendency of urban-rural inequality will be explored in 
details. But before doing so, it is worthwhile having, as a background, a quick 
review of the neo-classical economic explanations on the issue. 
2 J. 1 Urban-Rural Inequality and Neo-Classical Economic Theories 
Neo-classical economic theories have never analyzed the issue of urban-rural 
inequality separately. In the eyes of the neo-classical economists, urban-rural 
inequality, which is an inevitable outcome during the initial stage of economic 
growth, will disappear automatically as an economy grows. The mechanism 
responsible for this phenomenon is the market. In the simplest two-region 
� m o d e l , factors of production including land, capital and labour are free to 
move from one region to another according to their marginal productivity. 
During the initial stage of economic growth, one region may prosper at the 
expense of the other. But, as the marginal productivity of factors of 
production in these two regions are adjusted over time, regional inequality 
will be narrowed ultimately. 
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More refined models of this nature include the labour-surplus and the 
export-base models. One finds in the former model the binary distinctions of 
the modern and the traditional sectors (or core and periphery in growth pole 
analysts' term). Its primary focus is on the process of labour transfer, the 
growth of output and employment of the modern sector (for instance Lewis 
1954，Chenery 1979). Investment, technology, credits and industrialization in 
the modern sector contribute to its growth in output and employment. Massive 
rural surplus labour is thus attracted to the modern sector because of its 
relatively high wages. Based on the assumption of unlimited supply of rural 
labour and reinvestment of profits, the modem sector will continue to expand 
by absorbing rural labour. The process will continue until all rural surplus 
labour has been absorbed in the new industrial sector. At this stage, the 
traditional sector has been structurally changed and integrated into the modem 
sector. Thus the urban-rural inequality will disappear with the spread of the 
modem sector. A similar development process can be detected in the concept 
of export-base. Based on the assumption that local economic growth is a 
function of external demand, success in export and trade is the determining 
factor of regional growth. Revenues from trade and export feed the process of 
accumulation and regional diversification in the initial stage of growth, but 
will lead to a long run tendency of diminishing regional inequalities. 
� The function of the market equilibrating mechanism has gained 
empirical support from Williamson's (1965) and El-Shakhs' (1972) well 
known studies. On the basis of a sample of 24 countries, Williamson (1965) 
investigates the pattern of regional disparities as related to national economic 
development. By employing the cross-section approach and time series 
analysis, Williamson (1965:44) argues that there is a systematic relationship 
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between regional inequality and national development. In the international 
dimension, developing countries are found to have greater regional inequality 
than developed countries. In the inter-country dimension, the finding is 
consistent to that in the international dimension�. And finally, regional 
inequality is found more extensive in the agricultural sector than in the 
industrial sector. Based on these findings, he generally concludes that: 
"...rising regional income disparities and increasing North-South 
dualism is typical of early development stages, while regional 
convergence and a disappearance of severe North-South 
problems is typical of the more mature stages of national growth 
and development" (Williamson 1965:44). 
In his study of the evolution of city primacy in 75 countries, El-Shakhs 
(1972) has provided more evidences on the function of the market 
equilibrating mechanism. His research findings show that city primacy 
increases initially when a region's economy starts to grow. When most of the 
urban functions , political and economic power and population are 
concentrated in one or few primate cities by the centripetal force, the region 
reaches the most intensive stage of spatial inequality and the level of primacy 
reaches the peak (El-Shakhs 1972:31). Eventually, a decentralization effect 
will be induced with the increasing influence of economic structural change in 
the periphery. In this stage, the economy reaches a full utilization of its 
undeveloped resources. The inter-regional pattern tends to become more 
balanced via the growth of the less developed regions and local urban centers, 
and the level of primacy decreases eventually. However, as stated by El-
Shakhs (1972:31): 
3 This conclusion is based on the situation of United State only. 
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"No time limit can be set for the endurance of this stage since it 
depends on several local conditions...." 
His statement seems to imply that various regions with different economic 
structures and performances will have different abilities towards regional 
convergence. Factors like market area, transportation, communication, and 
other changes in the factors of production may speed up or slow down the 
decentralization, and therefore the convergence process. 
The neo-classical economic arguments have been subjected to severe 
criticism. In actual operation, the market force is usually in disequilibrium 
rather than in equilibrium. The economic realities of trade barriers, 
protectionism, the strategy of priority growth and poor communication 
network have challenged all the unrealistic assumptions of free competition, 
perfect information and free mobility of factors of production. Accordingly, 
market disequilibrium will contribute to an over-concentration of investments 
and economic activities in the urban areas, especially the larger ones. The 
normal operation of the market equilibrium mechanism has thus been 
interfered by domination and monopoly. Under market disequilibrium, not 
only the objective of absorbing labour into remunerative employment is 
failed, but also is the intrinsic relationship between productron and 
consumption seriously distorted (Lo and Salih 1981:134). The consequence is 
regional exploitation and imbalance growth between the urban and the rural. 
The worst situation is a total failure of fulfilling even the basic need 
requirements of local people. Experiences of both Latin America and Africa 
have provided vivid examples of this worst scenario. 
23 
2-3.2 Theories of Unequal Exchange 
Emerging from the Neo-classical tradition, theories of unequal exchange 
concern themselves with the interflows between regions and the way these 
interflows contribute to the observable regional inequality. In general, theories 
of unequal exchange can be divided into two categories: quantitative and 
qualitative. Quantitative theories of unequal exchange are in facts 
mathematical models, comprising operational functions of the urban-rural 
linkages as well as other forms of regional linkages. Qualitative theories, on 
the other hand, focus dominantly on the philosophical aspects, trying to 
generalize the law and contexts of regional linkages and interactions. In this 
section, we shall focus on the qualitative theories of unequal exchange rather 
than on their quantitative counterparts. 
The theory of unequal exchange is originally presented by Emmanuel 
(1972) as an extension of Marx's transformation problems of international 
trade. Emmanuel argues that unequal exchange is the cause of uneven 
development between regions. While his central idea is found upon Marx's 
labour theory of value, unequal exchange is generally viewed as a 
geographical flow of value contributed by trade and direct exchange between 
two specific sectors or regions. The main body of the argument can be 
summarized as follow. For every exchange of commodities, not only an 
equivalent monetary value is exchanged, but also an exchange of labour value 
is involved. Labour value is the socially necessary labour time embodied to 
produce (or reproduce) a commodity. If prices of exports and imports are not 
proportional to their respective labour values, the exchanges will be unequal. 
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The deviation of price from its corresponding value, according to 
Emmanuel (1972:52-3), depends on whether the surplus value can be realized 
locally. Under the assumption of imperfect mobility of labour, he argues that 
the loss in surplus value, itself an outcome of wage inequality, is "alone the 
cause of the inequality of exchange" (1972:61). Moreover, unequal exchange 
can be aggravated by the unequal organic compositions of labour (1972:157). 
In his framework, unequal exchange has two folds of meaning; in the broadest 
sense, it refers to all variations in prices and values, while in the strictest 
sense, it refers to only prices deviated from values as a result of the 
differential rates of surplus value (1972:37-104). Unequal exchange in the 
broadest sense is not regarded as a meaningful indicator of surplus transfer, 
because it occurs in any productive system characterized by different technical 
combinations of means of production. 
To examine unequal exchange in the strictest sense, Emmanuel 
assumes that a perfect mobility of capital and perfect immobility of labour 
exist on an international scale. In the periphery, historical and other 
exogenous reasons contribute to lower wages and thus the relatively higher 
rate of profits and surplus value (Emmanuel 1972). Internationally mobile 
capital would search for higher profits by minimizing production cost in the 
periphery until the rate of profit falls to the world average. Accordingly, 
trading activity between regions will ultimately lead to outflow of values, 
resulting in the underdevelopment of the peripheral nations or regions. 
Whether the mechanism of unequal exchange will change over time is 
still debatable. Though Emmanuel suggests that it is the inequality in wage 
that has caused unequal exchange, his analysis has ignored the temporal 
dimension of this causal relationship. De Janvry and Kramer (1979:30), for 
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instance, argue that "capital mobility tends to eliminate wage differences", and 
thus unequal exchange will disappear automatically over time. Without 
denying the concept of capital mobility, Gibson (1980:23), however, defends 
that "capital can be mobile, yet fail to move; what is required for its actual 
movement is the incentive of higher profits". The incentive of capital 
movement, as argued by Gibson, is eliminated by a set of reproduction prices, 
which guarantees all production branches to earn the on-going rate of profits, 
even though wages are lower and capital is fully mobile (1980:23). As a 
result, unequal exchange will persist over time. 
Emmanuel's work has attracted lot of attention (see De Janvry & 
Kramer 1979; Gibson 1980; Marelli 1983; Webber & Foot 1984). Most of the 
responses are concerned with the meaning and applicability of his theory, such 
as Gibson's work on Peru and United State, Marelli's work on Italy and 
Webber & Foot's work on Philippines and Canada. Besides, most of these 
works, which are discussed in quantitative terms, concern themselves with 
model building. 
It is Hadjimichalis (1987) who has enriched the debate of unequal 
exchange philosophically. He remarks that there are two main defects in the 
theory of unequal exchange. First, it has something to do with the parochial 
content of the theory. Second, there is no attempt to connect the transfer of 
value with the role of various social agents. On the first point, Hadjimichalis 
(1987:72) has observed that most of the empirical works on unequal exchange 
have over-emphasized the sphere of circulation and exchange. This will lead 
to a misleading conclusion that unequal exchange is the only mechanism of 
value transfer. However, value can be transferred via various channels and 
forms such as taxes and direct payments. Unequal exchange only represents 
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value contributed by indifferent prices in the sphere of circulation. It is only a 
part of value transfer rather than all of it. 
Hadjimichalis challenges the monotonous content of unequal exchange 
by introducing the concepts of "differentially localized accumulation ” (DLA) 
and of "geographical transfer of value" (GTV). DLA is, according to him 
(1987:62), the underlying mechanism which contributes to uneven 
development. Its operation is dependent on a region's production structure, its 
current performance and the historical mode of its integration to both the 
national and the international divisions of labour. All these factors, which 
make up the organic composition of a region such as capital intensity and 
level of technology, affect the region's accumulation process. The higher the 
organic composition of a region, the higher the potential of DLA it will be. 
GTV, the outcome of the operation of this mechanism, represents the 
reallocation of surplus value from the periphery to the core. It is based on a 
much broader concept including various channels and forms of transfer 
besides the sphere of circulation (Hadjimichalis 1987:70). His empirical study 
on southern Europe demonstrates that geographical transfer of value 
comprises financial, living labour and commodity transfers. In other words, 
unequal exchange is only a component of geographical transfer of value. 
The second defect raised by Hadjimichalis relates to the importance of 
social agents in the transfer of value. As argued by Hadjimichalis (1987:68), 
both the state and local authority secure a region's DLA potential by 
intervening into its sphere of circulation and reproduction of labour force. For 
any regions without government intervention, DLA remains low and capitalist 
expansion declines. This difference in government intervention has 
contributed to the reproduction of regional uneven development over time 
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(Hadjimichalis 1987:68). GTV also occurs directly where there are actions 
mediating the local production of surplus value (1987:74). In this case, surplus 
value as produced by a region is transferred to elsewhere officially by the 
mediation of the state or local authorities. Accumulation process in this region 
is thus distorted, and the size of local market decreases accordingly. 
Though Hadjimichalis' work has enriched Emmanuel's theory of 
unequal exchange, both their works have remained unsatisfactory for our 
purpose. Although both concepts are developed for capitalism, one wonders 
whether or not unequal exchange and geographical transfer of value are 
unique to it? By examining Marx's original notion of unequal exchange, 
Houston & Paus (1987:92) argue that "exchanges may be unequal due to one 
party in the exchange holding a more favored or powerful position: unequal 
exchange resulting from monopoly, political favoritism, and repression". This 
implies that while unequal exchange (or geographical transfer of value) is 
possible under capitalism, it is not necessarily unique to it. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to postulate that unequal exchange may also exist in planned 
economies, where the State plays a dominant role in political and economic 
decisions. Moreover, though Hadjimichalis has emphasized the role played by 
social agents, his treatment is insufficient to explain the situation in the 
centrally planned economies, where factors of production are allocated by 
plans and orders. Accordingly, resource transfer may also be planned. Given 
the peculiar features of the planned economies, it is not unreasonable to 
postulate that their transfer mechanisms operate in a different way. In short, a 
more thoughtful theory is needed to capture the situation of the planned 
economies. 
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2.3.3 The Concept of "Urban Bias" 
Emerging from a different theoretic tradition, theories of urban bias have 
penetrated the political and economic structure of a society to evaluate the 
underlying mechanism which contributes to regional inequality. They have 
raised heated discussions among scholars and made a profound impact on the 
field of development studies. Theories of urban bias, in general, concern the 
way in which urban-rural relationships influence the nature of development, 
and the relocation of resources in particular. Based on the assumption that 
there is a clear distinction between the urban and the rural, i.e. the urban class 
and the rural class, Lipton (1977, 1982) attempts to explain why poor people 
stay poor in most developing countries in the "class-theoretic" approach 
(Moore 1993:80). He (Lipton 1977:67) argues that: 
"...the basic conflict in the Third World is not between capital 
and labour, but between capital and countryside, farmer and 
townsman, villager (including temporarily urban "fringe 
villager") and urban industrial employer-cum-proletarian elite, 
grainers from dear food and gainers from cheap food". 
Accordingly, all urban elites are interested in cheap food for the motive of 
keeping wages low, while those from the rural community is against cheap 
food. However, as stated by Lipton (1977:13): 
"The rural contains most of the poverty...but the urban sector 
contains most of the articulateness, organization and power. So 
the urban classes have been able to ’win' most of the rounds of 
the struggle with the countryside...." 
The power of urban elites enables them to dominate the distribution of 
resources and direct a disproportionate share of resources towards their own 
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interest. Their power is determined not only by their economic role, but also 
their capacity to organize, centralize and control. In contrast, rural people, 
numerous in number but dispersed, poor and unorganized, are politically 
powerless. Even worse, they fight against each other locally and, at the 
national level, they seek to join the urban power rather than develop their own 
power (Lipton 1982:66). 
Lipton does not only suggest that urban bias keeps poverty, but also 
stresses that inequality within the rural areas is contributed by development 
policies which are urban biased (Lipton 1982:68). He argues that an "urban 
alliance" of rich farmers (or "big farmers" in Lipton's term) and urban elites 
exist. The big fanners, who are the better-off in the rural area, get most of the 
rural investment, price support, agricultural subsidies, etc. from urban elites 
and in turn with cheap surplus, food, savings, exportable, human capital, etc. 
A lot of rural resources is therefore transferred to the urban. 
Lipton's theory is vulnerable to criticism. Though he has highlighted 
the difference in political power and its influence on development among the 
urban and rural groups, he has not addressed why it is so and whether the 
power of these groups can change over time. Based on the theories of 
collective action (or, in Bates' (1993:221) terminology, interest group 
approach), Bates (1981a) has reformulated Lipton's work by reducing the 
level of theoretical abstraction. His study on Africa attempts to connect the 
political powerless of rural groups with the rural realities such as the large 
size, dispersion and communication difficulties, so as to unravel the reasons 
behind the powerlessness of these rural groups. His research has exposed the 
state's behaviour towards urban bias: why does the state behave the way it 
does? Bates' framework has, as Varshney (1993:16) comments, provided 
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"greater room for political and economic contingence in account for urban 
bias". 
In comparison, there is no unique theory on rural bias, although this 
concept has been widely used to explain rural based policies. For instance, 
Byres (1972, 1974), while rejecting Upton's eulogy on the rural sector, insists 
that a strategy of industrial priority is necessary in generating attendant 
increase in income and equality for all. With the industrial sector as the engine 
of development, surplus must be siphoned off from the agricultural sector at 
the initial stage of economic growth (Byres 1974:221). But the reality is that 
there are always resistance and obstacles to the extraction of rural surplus 
from a truculent peasantry, or there is "rural bias". His study on India (1972) 
provides challenging evidences on the rural bias in trade between the 
agricultural and the industrial sectors. The failure to generate agricultural 
surplus for industrial use shows that there are rural bias rather than urban bias 
in India. Since Byres' thesis has, as commented by Corbridge (1982:103), 
ignored the power of urban and rural bias, rural bias can only be established as 
an adjunct to his insistence on industrialization. Similar to Byres, Mitra 
(1977), who draws on India's development, has also provided evidence in 
exact opposite to Lipton. Using a similar political economic model as 
Upton's, Mitra (1977:63) argues that it is the alliance of rural and urban elites 
to distort terms of trade in favour of the rural that has caused the industrial 
growth rate to decline since the mid 1960s. Apart from their conclusions about 
whether India is characterized by urban or rural biased, there are some 
differences between Upton's and Mitra's substance of arguments. While 
Lipton is criticized for his ignorance of rural rich and urban poor (Corbridge 
1982:95-7), Mitra is praised for his ability to get into intra-sectoral class 
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contradiction. A four-fold sectoral class scheme has been adopted in his 
analysis, namely the surplus-raising rich peasants and the small or landless 
peasants in the agricultural, and the bourgeoisie and the working class in the 
urban (Mitra 1977:99). Nevertheless, both Byres' and Mitra's works have 
provided a counter-Liptonian thesis of "rural bias". 
The theories of urban bias have long been criticized for their over-
simplification. The critical point is Upton's acceptance of the binary and 
discrete distinction between the urban and the rural (Unwin 1982:15). Since a 
thoughtful collection of critiques have been documented in the recent special 
issue of Journal of Development Studies (1993), we will not elaborate these 
critiques in detail but simply outline their arguments. 
Firstly, it is always difficult to detect the urban-rural boundaries - a 
problem well known for quite a long time. Moore (1984:17) has demonstrated 
three difficulties in practicing the binary division. Since rural industries have 
grown extensively in most of the developing countries, the first difficulty is to 
separate rural area and industries. The second concerns the cropping patterns. 
While Lipton and his followers regard food grains as the main rural product, 
what are the non-food agricultural exports, i.e. cash crop? The third is the 
influence of spatial effects on the objective interests and political power of the 
rural population. 
Second, the theories of urban bias have neglected the role of political 
institutions. While Lipton and Bates have inferred the biases of public policies 
from the power of interest groups (something societal), they have not "gone 
inside the state" to examine how economic policies are actually formed 
(Varshney 1993:16). Recent studies on Taiwan (Moore 1993)，China (Oi 
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1993) and South-east Asia (Timmer 1993) have explored the important 
position of rural agencies and local government in promoting rural 
developments. 
Third, the role of innovations has remained unexplored in the theories 
of urban bias. This is important, because technology, which changes over 
time, can have political implications for government behaviours. Empirical 
studies show that agro-industries have grown in most of the third world. This 
tendency may alter the prolonged poverty of the rural, thereby rendering it 
powerful. 
Finally, urban bias theories have ignored some interests, which are 
cross-cutting in nature, and their political impacts on rural groups. These 
interests, religious and ethnic etc., may produce intra-rural difference and 
obstruct the unity of the rural groups. Moreover, the interests of the urban and 
the rural groups are only expressed in economic terms. 
Besides these critiques, two additional comments can be mentioned. 
First, similar to the problems raised with the under-specification of the urban-
rural boundaries, interests between the urban and the rural are not clear-cut 
too. It is the class conflict nature of urban bias that has contributed to a clear 
division of classes and their interests. Accordingly, the basic conflict in most 
of the third world, says Upton (1977:67), is between "gainers from dear food 
and gainers from cheap food". While the interest of urban classes is for cheap 
foods, that of rural community is against cheap food. It is obvious that 
Lipton's argument has been based on the traditional binary distinctions of 
urban-industry and rural-agriculture. The rise of rural industries in the 
developing countries, as demonstrated by Ho (1982), Oi (1993) and Moore 
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(1993) etc., implies that both the urban and the rural industries may have 
identical interests. Conflicts between the rural and the urban may take the 
form of competition for industrial raw materials and markets rather than that 
of extraction and counter-extraction of cheap food. The "urban alliance"， 
following Upton's framework, trends to be cooperative owing to their 
common interest in industrial development. As a result, we may come up with 
a conclusion completely different from Upton's. 
Secondly, urban bias theories have ignored the significance of ideology 
to political institutions and their impacts. Nolan and White's (1984) evaluation 
of urban bias in China has exposed this weakness. Since it is possible to find 
contrasting evidences to support both concepts of urban bias and rural bias, 
they conclude that the political division between the urban and the rural 
classes is "less important than that between state and society" (Nolan and 
White 1984:77). Nolan and White's conclusion implies that greater attention 
should be devoted to the important role of ideology of development in future 
research. Given that many of the less developed countries are socialist 
countries, the political significance of the ideology of socialism and the role of 
state intervention should have profound impacts on the politics of 
development. To steer research along this direction, one may provide insights 
into the fundamental problem of urban bias: why do some states promote rural 
interests while others do not. 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on Chinese urban-rural inequality and 
relevant western concepts on the same issue. It has found that the literature is 
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not only rare, but also unsatisfactory. In the Chinese-language literature, 
researchers have focused on the discussion of scissors differential: its 
formation, estimation and impacts on urban-rural inequality. It is generally 
concluded that scissors differential is the main cause of urban-rural inequality. 
This interpretation is not without problems. While scissors differential 
represents resource transfer via the price mechanism only, those via non-price 
channels have been neglected. Nevertheless, the post-reform period is 
characterized by the emergence of non-price channel of resource flow. As a 
result, the significance of scissors differential may be diminished. In the 
English-language literature, urban-rural inequality is usually attributable to the 
implementation of the Soviet model of development. Most of the researches in 
the field, however, are concerned with the Maoist period, rather than the post-
reform period. The underlying mechanisms which contribute to the inequality 
and the spatial relations are, among others, issues that have been ignored. In 
sum, the literature on Chinese urban-rural inequality, in both Chinese and 
English languages, have been found wanting. 
This chapter has also examined western concepts which explain the 
underlying mechanisms on urban-rural inequality. These concepts include 
neo-classical economic theory, unequal exchange and urban bias. The 
assumptions of neo-classical economic theory, which depend too heavily on 
the function of the market, have been found unrealistic. While the concepts of 
unequal exchange and of GTV deal with the interflows between the urban and 
the rural, they fail to capture the non-market channel and those resource 
transfers manipulated by various government agents. While urban bias has 
proposed a "class-theoretic" approach to evaluate the underlying mechanisms 
of urban-rural inequality, it has failed to address, especially for our purpose, 
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the political significance of the ideology of socialism and the role of State. In 
short, if we are to unravel the mechanisms underlying Chinese urban-rural 
inequality, it is necessary to construct a better-informed framework for 
analysis, a task that we shall take on board in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
GEOGRAPHIC TRANSFER OF RESOURCES: 
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Introduction 
Since most of the existing work and theories have serious limitations, it is 
imperative to establish a new concept to capture the issue of urban-rural 
inequality in China. The objective of this chapter is to introduce the concept 
of Geographic Transfer of Resources (GTR) to explain the underlying 
mechanism which contributes to the prolonged observable inequalities in 
China. It will be elaborated in two broad parts. 
The first is the introduction of GTR, which is the underlying 
mechanism contributed to inter-regional and inter-sectoral resource transfers. 
Different from the concepts of "unequal exchange" and of "geographical 
transfer of value", which focus on the capitalist economy, GTR is based on a 
much broader concept and concerns the planned economy. The role the State 
is also stressed in this mechanism. As stated by Weeks (1981) and Webber & 
Foot (1984), a theory of this kind has at least two sides: qualitative and 
quantitative. This chapter focuses on the qualitative side, while leaving the 
quantitative side to the next chapter. 
The second part of the elaboration is concerned with the operation of 
GTR in China. The discussion will be divided into two sections, first, on the 
non-spatial mechanism, and then, on the spatial relations. In the former, the 
discussion is based on the principles of political economy. In the latter, the 
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change in spatial structure and its effects on GTR will be highlighted. In the 
final section, various types of resource transfer in China will be identified. 
3.2 The Concept of GTR 
The concept is developed from the idea of "unequal exchange". Different 
from unequal exchange, however, GTR is established upon the inherent 
features of the planned economy and the socialist state, namely the economic 
tendency to produce shortage and underproduction and the political tendency 
to assert state control (see Tang's (1990a, 1991) applications on China's urban 
land development and regional uneven development). 
Let us assume that in a planned economy (and, in many cases, a closed 
economy too), regions can be clearly demarcated into urban and rural, and 
sectors into industrial and agricultural. Also industrial (secondary) activities 
can be found in urban regions and agricultural (primary) activities in rural 
regions (see Fig. 3.1). Therefore, there are only inter-regional and inter-
sectoral interactions. Regions and sectors are dependent on each other for 
survival. Regions that manufacture industrial commodities trade with regions 
that produce raw materials to obtain the commodities in scarcity, and vice 
versa. In other words, inter-regional and inter-sectoral interactions are 
inevitable, and in fact essential, in this type of economy. These interactions 
are very important because regions and sectors depend on each other for raw 
materials or production goods. 
Given that the planned economy is an economy of shortage, the 
development of different regions and sectors can be characterized as operating 
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under the soft budget constraint. For a production enterprise to be under soft 
budget constraint, it means that "if it works with loss, that does not yet lead to 
real bankruptcy, i.e. ceasing operation" (Kornai 1980a:28). If a region behaves 
exactly like an enterprise with soft budget constraint, its demand is hardly 
constrained by solvency considerations. An urban region, which manufactures 
Fig. 3.1 A Conceptual Diagram of the GTR Mechanism 
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secondary commodities, tends to acquire as much raw material as possible so 
as to minimize shortage. The other side of the coin is that its products face an 
inelastic demand from the urban region as well as its rural counterpart. 
Similarly, agricultural products and raw materials from a rural region also face 
an insatiable demand from both regions. These insatiable demands will have 
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the effect of siphoning off resources from the rural region. This is because the 
urban region is self-sufficient in industrial commodities, and therefore a loss 
in resource only occurs between firms within the urban region rather than 
between regions. For the urban region as a whole, there is a gain, rather than a 
loss, in resource. 
Resource transfer is more serious when the urban region is given the 
priority of growth, which can be understood as an inevitable result of 
economic growth in a shortage economy. Accordingly, resource transfer is 
accelerated intentionally by the intervention of the State. The rationale for 
regional priority of growth can be stated as follow. In a closed economy, 
where international connection does not prevail, there is no foreign input. 
Regions and sectors must generate higher rates of domestic accumulation to 
stimulate a faster rate of economic growth. However, owing to the resource 
constraints, it is impossible for every region or sector to generate high 
domestic accumulation. Thus, it is usually up to the State to determine the 
priority of each sector or region in terms of the rate of accumulation and 
hence economic growth. And the urban region and the industrial sector are 
usually the choices of rapid growth. 
To generate domestic accumulation, the selected regions or sectors are 
required to suppress their consumption^ or reduce the production costs. 
However, given the impossible task of achieving a complete suppression of 
consumption, the practical alternative is to minimize the production costs by 
controlling the prices of both labour and of raw materials and agricultural 
4 The term consumption here means both the consumption of consumer goods and 
production goods. 
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products to a low levels. In this way, the overall consumption of the society 
will be suppressed, and more resources will be eventually siphoned off to 
promote economic growth. Nevertheless, any attempts for the selected regions 
or sectors to minimize production costs will ultimately cause a transfer of 
resources. These resources are in fact not lost, but being transferred to 
somewhere else in the form of sectoral and regional flow in a closed 
economy. If we focus our attention on the level of region, the concomitant 
outcome of the transfer of resource is regional divergence. 
Growth priority further softens the already soft budget constraint and 
thus widens the urban-rural divergence. In a shortage economy, expansion 
drive exists in all regions and sectors. This leads to an insatiable and 
permanent investment hunger. But the expansion drive and investment hunger 
will be satisfied at the expense of those of other regions. Since resources 
originally allocated to other regions will be transferred to the selected region, 
the latter丨s budget constraint will in fact be further softened. To summarize, in 
a shortage economy, growth priority (1) guarantees the region's expansion and 
investment desire in advance, i.e. the selected region has the priority in getting 
the resources under the government's investment quota system; and (2) it 
further softens the selected region's budget constraint. The ending result is that 
most resources are allocated to the selected region. 
As noted earlier, only the urban areas enjoy high rates of domestic 
accumulation and thus economic growth. The rural areas, in contrast, usually 
5 One of the main criticisms of Emmanuel's concept of unequal change is that he 
treats wages in the periphery as stagnant and determined by institutional and political 
elements (Houston & Paus 1987:93). However, this assumption is valid for the 
mechanism of GTR. In order to reserve more resources for accumulation, it is 
necessary to control the wage to a low level and suppress the overall consumption of 
the society. 
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suffer, since part of their local resources is transferred outward in the form of 
necessary supplies for urban production. This process of resource transfer will 
gain momentum over time and further siphon resources off the rural areas and 
widening the disparity between the urban and the rural. 
We label this mechanism that causes urban-rural inequality the 
"geographic transfer of resources" (GTR). GTR is a systemic feature of the 
socialist countries. It will continue to operate as long as the shortage economy 
together with its soft budget constraint prevail. This is one aspect of the 
systemic dimension of GTR. 
The other is that the socialist state plays an important role in the GTR 
mechanism. It dominates all economic decision processes and intervenes in 
every aspect of daily life. It formulates and implements policies on taxation, 
banking network, prices, employment and state investment and subsidies. 
More importantly, it does not hesitate to impose direct control on the details of 
all production process. It also acts as a resource distributor granting 
favourable terms to selected regions via the price mechanism, trade 
manipulation and direct subsidies. One such example of state intervention is 
the well publicized Stalinist strategy of economic growth. The two main 
characteristics of this strategy are: centralized administration and priority 
growth in heavy industries. These two characteristics are interdependent 
because only a strong state can guarantee the strategy of priority growth. 
Recollect that this strategy, which softens the budget constrains of the urban 
area, has the effect of encouraging more resources being transferred out of the 
rural areas. It then becomes obvious that the State plays an important role in 
the mechanism of GTR. 
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Until now, the discussion of GTR has been based upon a binary 
distinction between the urban and the rural, with the former equating to 
industries and the latter to agriculture. But, more and more studies tend to 
show that during the recent decades, non-agricultural activities have 
developed rapidly in the rural areas and that most of these activities are in fact 
industrial in nature. It is then imperative to take this development into 
consideration and update the original two-region model (see Fig. 3.2). In 
acknowledging the presence of rural industries, we need to consider other 
resource transfers under the GTR mechanism. There are not only inter-
regional resource flows, but also inter-sectoral resource flows within the rural 
region. However, whether rural industries contribute to resource loss or not 
depends on the nature of the industries. Two situations can be enumerated: 
(1). Rural industries are sub-contracted by urban industries, i.e. rural 
industries are the branches of urban industries and under their control; and 
(2). Rural industries have the same position as urban industries; they 
compete for raw materials, capitals as well as markets. 
In the former case, resources will be drained out of the rural areas. Since rural 
industries are sub-contracted by urban industries, prices of the former's 
products are suppressed by the latter. Rural resources are thus transferred via 
the price differential. In the latter case, rural industries contribute to resource 
gain, because a portion of resource loss due to GTR can be compensated by 
the contribution of rural industries. A clearer picture will be provided in the 
next chapter, where the price differential is considered. 
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3.3 The Operation of GTR in China 
This section aims at elaborating the locally specific conditions leading to the 
operation of GTR in China. These conditions can be understood as the 
necessary outcomes of the implementation of the "traditional" Soviet or 
Stalinist growth strategy. Although some scholars (such as Wang 1989) argue 
that China has no major economic policy before 1975，it is obvious that all 
policies and measures adopted during this period favoured a Stalinist model of 
development. It is well known that the first FYP (1953-57) was modeled on 
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the orthodox of Stalinist growth strategy (see e.g. Chan 1992, Ogden 1992, 
Selden 1993, Wang 1993). This section will elaborate how this strategy has 
brought forward the conditions for the operation of the GTR and resource 
transfer before 1979. Economic reform in the 80s has weakened the 
mechanism, nevertheless the latter is still in operation, albeit in a less distinct 
way. This section will also document the necessary changes induced by 
economic reform. 
The centralized administration in China can be understood as a 
guarantee for priority growth in the past. The CCP determined the overall 
policies of the country. Both the State Planning Commission and the State 
Economic Commission - all under the central government - decided how to 
carry out these policies. State commissions, ministries and bureaux then 
allocated resources according to different economic objectives. For each 
enterprise, it was the central administrators that set its production targets, 
distributed its products, allocated its equipment and took over its profits. So 
what an enterprise should produce, how much to be produce, how to use the 
depreciation fund and how to manage production, were all planned by the 
State. Each individual's and household's decision on jobs, income distribution, 
etc. were determined by the State in the form of rationing of consumer goods 
and allocation of urban housing etc. A vertically organized system (commonly 
known as vertical administration) was established. 
The priority growth strategy implemented by this vertical system 
stipulated that industry, especially heavy industries such as machineries and 
basic metals, should receive a lion's share of state investment. During the first 
FYP, 36.2 % of the total investment was in fact allocated to the heavy 
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industries (Fig. 3.3). Its share increased to 54% during the second FYP (1958-
1962) (Guojia Tongjiju 1992:158). 
Fig. 3.3 The Percentage Share of Heavy Industry 
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Source: Guojia Tongjiju 1992:158, Table 5-18. 
Another fundamental element of priority growth was a high growth rate 
based on huge domestic accumulation. The policy of "production first, 
livelihood second {xin shengzhan, hou shenghuo) reflected this mentality. 
During the first FYP, accumulation rate accounted for only 24.2% of the 
country's national income. It increased to 30.8% during the second FYP and 
about 33% during both the fourth and fifth FYPs (1971-1975 and 1976-1980, 
respectively) (Guojia Tongjiju 1992:40). 
In 1953, the Chinese State resorted to the system of unified purchase 
and unified sale" {tonggou tongxiao) to guarantee high rates of accumulation. 
The objectives of this system were: (1) to ensure that the necessary raw 
materials were available at a low price; and (2) to reduce the State's financial 
burden on wages and food subsidies for urban workers by maintaining enough 
food at a low price (Chen 1954). Under this system, all farm products were 
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compulsorily procured by the State at a planned purchasing price (tonggoujia) 
and then redistributed at a planned selling price (tongxiao jia). At most of the 
time, the selling price was lower than the purchasing price. A considerable 
amount of rural savings has thus been forcibly siphoned out of the rural areas, 
contributing to the high speed of industrial growth in the urban areas. 
The mechanism of GTR was operated within this context. Most of the 
resources from the rural areas were transferred to the urban areas by orders 
and administration. By suppressing the prices of agricultural products, raw 
materials and food grains to very low levels, the State reduced the production 
costs of the urban industrial sectors and, conversely, increased their net 
profits. Through taxes contributed by the industrial sectors, the State 
converted these profits into the state construction funds. This capital was then 
reinvested into the urban industrial sectors for generating reproduction in the 
form of State investment or subsidies. Rural resources were pumped out to the 
urban areas invisibly under this series of capital flows. In this way, the State's 
investment and subsidies could also be viewed as a kind of resource transfer. 
The above has elaborated the situation during the Maoist period. Is the 
post-reform period different from this description? As argued earlier, priority 
growth is an inevitable result of resource constraint. So, irrespective of the 
changes made to the economic growth strategy, capital and other resources 
will still concentrate in the urban areas as well as the industrial sectors. The 
mechanism of GTR, which has its root in this economic system, will continue 
to operate. As a result, although various reform measures have weakened the 
mechanism of priority growth during the era of economic reform, the urban 
areas and the industrial activities are still the favourite recipients of 
investment. The investment picture tends to support this argument. During the 
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seventh FYP (1986-1990)，investment in heavy industries accounted for 
44.3% of the total state investment, whereas those in light industries and 
agriculture only made up 7.5% and 3.3% respectively (Fig. 3.4)6. According to 
the State Planning Commission the output value ratio of industrial and 
agricultural sector in the coming decade (1993-2003) will be adjusted to the 
ratio of 84:16 (a 8% increase in the industrial sector and a corresponding 8% 
decrease in the agricultural sector when compared with the current figures); 
the share of productive investment {shengchanxing touzi) will increase from 
62% to about 66% in the coming years?. Since resource distribution is 
couched in terms of industrially oriented investment, the mechanism of GTR 
is thus still in operation. 
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6 The rapid growth of the consumption sectors in the 80s merely represents the 
reactions of light industries and agricultue after a prolonged period of stagnation. It 
is obvious that from the investment structure that a large amount of investment is 
still input to the industrial sectors. 
7 From LNJJRB, 26 Feb.,1993, p.3. 
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The underlying cause of priority growth can be explained by the 
investment hunger of the shortage economy. Economic reform has further 
stimulated the investment hunger and the expansion drive of different regions 
and sectors. It is because economic decentralization has relaxed the restriction 
on investment by allowing local governments to generate their own 
construction fund. In a shortage economy, this action produces further 
shortages and bring the economy into the vicious circle of "the more the 
investment, the more severe the expansion drive it will be". The rapid 
expansion of bank credits and the sky-rocketed inflation in the mid 80s have 
provided good examples of this phenomenon. 
Economic reform in the 80s has not changed the multi-level control 
system, but only decentralized economic power to the local level. This reform 
has weakened the fiscal power and the prestige of the State. The separation of 
the country's ledger into State and local accounts (fenzao chifan) implies that 
the State has lost her supreme authority on financial affairs. The former 
system of unified control and management had disappeared. Various kinds of 
industrial and commercial taxes, which are levied under different titles, are 
shared by the State and local governments. The only fixed income that the 
State can still collect is the revenues from the state-owned enterprises. Under 
this situation, to secure its revenues, the State can either enlarge its taxable 
incomes so as to meet the expenses of extensive economic activities and 
larger proportion of population, or retain control over the State-owned 
enterprises and maintain their high rates of growth, particularly those profit-
making enterprises. The latter method seems to be more appropriate, if the 
purpose is to enhance general economic efficiency. It can increase the State's 
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revenues in a relatively short period of time and work more effectively 
especially since the late 80s, when China has suffered from high inflation rate. 
While the State worries about the decrease in national revenues, local 
governments try their very best to increase local revenues so as to satisfy the 
local expansion drive and investment hunger. Moreover, because of resource 
constraint, local governments usually adopt the strategy of priority growth in 
order to channel the limited resources to a particular region or sector 
There are other reasons that help to account for the local government's 
emphasis on priority growth. As highlighted early, the economic reform has 
managed to alter the lip surface of the shortage economy. Naughton (1991:57) 
remarks that a large amount of domestic savings is still put to the industrial 
sectors via the banking system. The astonishing fact is that although economic 
decentralization and the financial responsibility system have abolished the 
unified control of finance {caizheng dagufan) of various local governments, 
bank credits are still under the unified control and management. This means 
that one can still obtain bank credits as if it was under a soft budget constraint. 
Meanwhile, for the purpose of increasing local revenues, the local 
governments are keen to establish more and more enterprises. Soft budget 
constraint in the form of bank credits provides a golden opportunity for the 
local governments to expand their investment in industries. The soft budget 
constraint of credit money together with economic decentralization have 
ultimately resulted in the concentration of investment in particular sectors or 
regions. Moreover, as claimed by Zhong (1990:173), an increase in output 
value is usually used as a criteria of achievements by the local governments. 
This also explains the reason behind the tendency of local governments to 
invest in the industrial sectors. 
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The present taxation system also favours the local governments to 
emphasize priority growth in industry. In 1991, over 68% of the total tax 
revenues was levied from the sphere of circulations. Take Jiangsu as example, 
the share contributed by the sphere of circulation was 96.74% in 19919. These 
figures imply that there is a positive relationship between tax revenues and the 
speed of generating production value. Zhong's (1990:173) study on 
Shangdong province shows that each 10% increase in industrial output value 
contributes to a 7% increase in its total revenues. It is thus obvious that it is in 
the interest of local governments (or probably the State) to sustain a high 
growth rate by increasing their total revenues. 
In short, what we have observed, as the outcome of the implementation 
of various economic reform measures, is the localization of the mechanism of 
GTR. With the increasing role of local governments in running production 
activities and redistributing resources across sectors and regions, the 
mechanism of GTR begins to operate at the local level. Many resources in 
transfer are now retained at the local level and redistributed by the local 
governments, rather than, as in the past, by the State. 
3.4 The GTR Mechanism in the Context of the Regional 
Administrative System 
That the mechanism of GTR has been localized, urges us to pay due attention 
to the administrative structure of local governments. We are also interested in 
the way the local government structure, something spatially contingent, 
8 Processed from data originally collected in Guojia Tongjiju (1992). 
9 Processed from data originally collected in Jiangsusheng Tongjiju (1992b). 
51 
affects the operation of GTR, something more structural. The effects of the 
traditional regional administrative system on the operation of the GTR will be 
discussed first. The institutional reform of city-leading-counties, which was 
implemented in the early 80s, has altered the former local government 
structure and produced new effects. The analysis then focuses on these 
changes and their effects on the mechanism of GTR. 
3A. 1 The Traditional Regional Administrative System and GTR 
The traditional administrative system reflects the State's quest for rapid 
industrialization in the past. As argued above, a central administration was 
needed to guarantee the process of rapid industrialization. In order to 
industrialize rapidly during the first FYP, the State adjusted the regional 
administrative system in 1953. It was a two-tier hierarchy comprising the 
provincial governments and the city/county governments (see Fig. 3.5). City 
governments were regarded as the urban, whereas county governments were 
considered as the rural. County governments were administratively under the 
prefecture agencies, which were only the representatives rather than the 
formal administrative organs of provincial government and possessed no 
virtual power. 
The urban and the rural areas were separated administratively under 
this system. City (shi) and county (xian) were established as administrative 
organs to manage the urban and the rural areas, respectively. Besides, the 
former specialized in industrial production whereas the latter in agricultural 
activities. Accordingly, the administrative jurisdiction overlapped with the 
economic sphere, with certain economic activities being organized and 
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managed by certain administrative organs. Inter-sectoral and inter-regional 
economic activities were highly restricted by administrative boundaries, and 
this resulted in numerous regional "fragments" (kuai kuai). For the rural areas, 
for instance, they were closed economic units specializing in food and raw 
material production. Their economic activities were determined more by 
orders and plans sent down from above than by direct contacts with the urban 
areas，whereas their daily operations were organized by local collectives and 
cooperatives. 
Apparently, it was this administrative-cum-economic structure that laid 
down the channel - literally vertical in nature - for resource transfer from the 
rural to the urban areas. Two forms of resource transfer via the vertical 
channel could be identified: one in the form of tax and the other in resources 
generated from the system of unified purchase and unified sale (see Fig. 3.6). 
Tax was regarded as a transfer only if it was over-levied or paid without 
compensation. In China, it has been a common practice to transfer tax and 
subsidies from one region or sector to another (especially in the case of inter-
provincial flow, see Tang (1991) for details), and it is regarded as a "booked 
transfer". A considerable amount of resources was thus transferred to the 
urban industrial sectors in the form of subsidies. 
Under the system of unified purchase and unified sale, the more output 
value the rural areas produced, the greater the loss in resources it would be. 
This was made possible by the fact that, on the one hand, rural resources had 
been transferred outward by price differentials between grains and industrial 
commodities, and that, on the other, the State seldom invested in the rural 
sectors. Agricultural investment accounted for only about 15% or less of the 
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Fig. 3.5 The Administrative Hierarchy before the 
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total State investment. Agricultural inputs, in fact, depended predominantly on 
the peasant's immense "revolutionary zeal" towards socialism. Because the 
system of unified purchase procured agricultural products compulsorily at 
extremely low prices, it was difficult to expect a progressive attitude toward 
self-investment from the peasants. As a result, we had experienced an one-
way transfer to the urban areas. 
In sum, under the rigid administrative system, only a vertical 
relationship existed between regions, and resource transfer was operated 
through this vertical channel, transforming most of the rural resources 
outward. 
3.4.2 Institutional Reform of City-Leading-Counties and GTR 
The new administrative system has altered the original structure by abolishing 
the prefecture agencies and, in replacement, upgrading the position of 
prefecture-level cities in the hierarchy. With all counties being put under the 
administrative jurisdictions of these cities, a three-level hierarchy of province-
city-county is thus formed (see Fig. 3.7). A leading city owns and administers 
a number of counties, and even cities. The enlargement of city jurisdiction 
implies an expansion of autonomy for the city governments, which possess 
more power in decision-making, at least within their administration 
boundaries. 
The new system represents a relatively efficient arrangement of 
resources for the leading cities (see Fig. 3.8). In the past, the urban and the 
rural are administered separately by the city government ( of prefecture-level 
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Fig. 3.7 The Administrative Hierarchy after 
the Institutional Reform of City-Leading-Counties 
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city) and by the prefecture agencies. The rigid administrative system made it 
impossible to have an efficient and unified management of local financial 
resources and inter-regional material transfer. Industrial "exports" to the rural 
areas, for example, had to go through four channels. Industrial products, 
which were first collected by the city's second-level station {erji zhan), were 
transferred to the prefecture agency's second-level station. These products 
were in turn transferred to the third-level wholesale department (sanji pifa 
bumen) of county and then distributed to various supply and marketing 
cooperatives (gongxiao she) and other retail outlets in the rural areas. The 
procurement and distribution of agricultural products followed the same 
procedure. Under the city-leading-counties system, a wholesale station {pifa 
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Fig. 3.8 The Mechanism of GTR After the Institutional Reform 
of City-Leading-Counties 
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z/zan) is directly established in the rural area by the city's second-level station. 
Accordingly, products from the rural areas go directly to the city's second-
level and third-level stations. Moreover, the central place function of the 
leading cities is emphasized under the new system. The leading cities act as 
the centers for administering circulation and production, thereby eliminating 
the unnecessary conflicts in orders from various local governments. 
The direct shipment of rural products to the city's retail outlets in the 
new system shows that horizontal linkages between regions and sectors have 
been restored. Horizontal linkages here mean the direct connections between 
sectors or regions, either established voluntarily or stipulated administratively. 
The increasing number of connections between rural and urban enterprises 
provides an evidence for the resurgence of horizontal linkage. Until 1989, a 
total of 199,000 horizontal cooperation have been established between the 
urban and the rural enterprises (township level only) (see Fig. 3.9). Most of 
these linkages involve the spread of production factors such as capital, skilled 
labour, planned energy supplies and raw materials, old machines from the 
urban to the rural, and the sharing of marketing channels (Pang 1992:11). A 
subcontracting relationship between rural and urban is also observed (Pang 
1992:9). -
It is obvious that under the new system, the power of the leading cities 
has been reinforced, with their subordinated counties suffering from a more 
direct and powerful control. As claimed by Fang (1989:21)，the system of 
city-leading-counties has re-employed the old administrative means for new 
economic targets. Leading cities can easily intervene into their counties' 
affairs by orders and commands. Most of the available raw materials and 
agricultural products in the rural are being transferred to the city-owned 
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enterprises by either unequal material trade or orders. This intervention can be 
called administratively stipulated horizontal linkage. 
Fig. 3.9 The Number of Rural Industrial Enterprises* 
in Connection With the Urban Enterprises 
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Source: Pang 1992:8, Table 2. 
Administratively stipulated horizontal linkage is, to some extent, an 
inevitable reaction to economic decentralization. Under economic 
decentralization, there are economic blockage, on the one hand, and economic 
expansion, on the other. To reduce the shortage problem, many local 
governments are interested in restricting the supply of raw materials, energy 
resources etc. to the consumption of their own enterprises. They also stipulate 
linkages between points of production and consumption by mandatory orders. 
The system of city-leading-counties allows the leading cities to directly 
intervene into their counties' spheres of planning, production, circulation and 
cooperation. The counties have become the city's base of raw materials, 
59 
suppliers of cheap labour and markets for their old equipment (Gao & Pu 
1987:38). Yingkou City and Anshan City, both leading cities of Liaoning 
province, tried to secure the supply of raw materials, agricultural products, 
energy resources and other products by constructing horizontal linkages with 
their led counties (N.A. 1983). Even worse, Weifang LC, Shangdong 
province, reassigned administratively a considerable number of profitable 
enterprises to her city jurisdiction, while relegating those loss-making 
enterprises to the counties (Gao & Pu 1987:37). This phenomenon has been 
identified and discussed by many researchers (see Wang 1992, Gao & Pu 
1987)，whom call it ‘‘city-extorting-county‘‘ {shi gua xian). 
Therefore, the restoration of horizontal linkages has, to the surprise of 
both laymen and experts, increased the amount of resources being transferred 
from the rural areas to the urban areas. For one reason, there are many more 
channels for resource transfer. Meanwhile, the State, which has survived the 
several rounds of economic devolution, is still financially responsible for her 
enterprises (and their employees) and other members of the society. In other 
words, the channels for vertical transfer have remained active. Resources of 
the rural areas can then be transferred outward via a vertical or horizontal 
channel, or both. A new situation of "dual-transfer" is thus formed, and more 
and more resources are expected to be transferred outward. 
The restoration of horizontal linkage has, on the one hand, broken 
down the former fragmented administrative structure and, on the other, 
established a new fragmented structure centered around the leading cities. 
With the control of GTR apparatuses (administrative power in this case) being 
left to the leading cities and the possible retention of resources for local use, 
this new structure is bound to be local and "cellular" in nature. The leading 
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cities, instead of the State or even the counties, have also become the "local 
despots’’ in local affairs due to their absolute power in making decisions. 
Consequently, the leading cities have more bargaining power when 
negotiating with the provincial governments on the issues of future planning 
and revenue expropriation. 
3.5 Various Forms of Vertical and Horizontal Resource Transfer 
There are a few forms of resource transfer under the mechanism of GTR. 
Vertical resource transfers include formal tax and resources derived from 
scissors differential (i.e. through the system of unified purchase and unified 
sale). Before the economic reform, resource transfers via formal tax included 
agricultural tax only. Some may argue that agricultural tax cannot be regarded 
as a resource loss since its ratio has always remained low in China. However, 
since the rural economic reform stimulates the rapid development of rural 
non-agricultural activities, circulation tax is thus extended to these activities, 
especially the industrial sector, in the rural areas. Tax payment from the rural 
areas has thus increased sharply (Table 3.1). According to the Ministry of 
Agriculture, a tax payment of RMB 43.47 billion was collected from the rural 
areas in 1991. 21.9% of this total came from agricultural tax, while the 
remaining 78.1% was from taxes on rural industries (Li 1992:47). 
Resources derived from scissors different al contribute to a 
considerable amount of vertical GTR. The Chinese literature regards this 
source as a "hidden tax" to the rural areas. In 1985, the establishment of the 
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Table 3.1 Tax Revenues From the Rural Areas 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Tax Revenues from 
Agricultural Tax (in 4.452 5.181 7.369 8.494 8.786 9.523 
billion) 
Agricultural Tax per 
Peasant {in dollar) 23.8 28.4 36.1 42.2 43.4 49.4 
as a % of the Peasant's 
Last Year Average Income 7.02 7.49 8.53 8.72 8.31 8.81 
Source: Li (1992:46), Table 1. 
"double track system" {shuanggui zhi) brought the monopoly of the State in 
agricultural pricing to an end. Free market prices are now used to set the State 
purchasing prices, which have been raised quite abruptly to reflect the soaring 
market prices. Take grain and cotton as two examples. Their State purchasing 
prices have increased 90% and 45% respectively, from 1984-19891�. 
"Negotiated prices", which refer to the free market prices literally, are 
introduced and applied to that portion above the quotas of compulsory 
procurement. In 1989, the average negotiated prices for rice and wheat were 
above RMB 40 yuan (per 100 jin), while the State purchasing prices were 
RMB 22 yuan and 28 yuan, respectivelyn. And the average State purchasing 
10 Processed from data originally collected in Guojia Tongjiju (1990:283). 
11 The 1989 State purchasing price for rice was announced in NMRB, 3 and 27 
March, while that for wheat was in Guojia Tongjiju Chengshi Shehui Jingji Diaocha 
Zongdui (1990:290). 
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prices for those agricultural products exceeding the contracts were RMB 33 
(per lOOym) (Guojia Tongjiju 1990:283). 
It is hesitant to say that all these changes have little weakening effects 
on the GTR and resource transfer. Prices are still manipulated by the State, 
which fixes the negotiated prices administratively. Although the peasants are 
allowed to sell their products in the free market for higher prices, local 
authorities can close the markets, set tariff barriers to prevent the peasants 
from selling their grain elsewhere at better prices^�. The establishment of 
"special grain reserves" in 1990 has reinforced the centralizing role of the 
State. Under this system, the portions of grains above those of planned sale at 
the State purchasing price and those of contract sale at negotiated price, are 
procured and administered directly by the State. According to Aubert 
(1991:13), this kind of requisition is a "second-round forced sales". It often 
distorts the purchases at the negotiated price. All these factors have affected 
the amount of resources returned to the rural areas. While the increase in the 
cost of input has wiped out the gains from the raise in purchasing price, these 
factors may increase resource transfer from the rural to the urban, further 
widening the gap between them. 
Moreover, as State investment in the rural areas before the economic 
reform was rare, the amount of resource transfer via scissors pricing was 
relatively small. The rural reform stimulates the peasants' incentive to produce 
and willingness to invest more in agricultural activities. The peasants' 
undertaking can be translated into resource transfer due to scissors 
12 Two cases have been reported in the newspapers: "closure of grain market" 
{RMRB, 2 Feb., 1989) and "barriers for grain trade" (NMRB, 17 Jan., 1989). 
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differential. One possible result is that the larger the amount of peasants' 
investment, the larger the amount of resource transfer it will be. 
Besides vertical transfer of resources, there are horizontal transfers. 
The latter embrace most of the local extra payments and fees. The "white 
strip", "green strip" and "red strip"丨3 are also considered as a kind of resource 
transfer from the rural areas. In general, different provinces have different 
types of levies, and in different amounts. Most levies are under the items of 
extra-education fee, rural insurance, security maintenance fee, payments for 
supporting city development, fee for resource management, fee for rural 
enterprise management administrative fee from village government 
{xiangtongchou) and collectively allotted payment {jiti tiliu) etc. (Cao et al 
1993, Liao 1993). Some of these fees are imposed by, and beneficial to, the 
local governments. The recent measure of allowing the local governments to 
use extra-budget capital (yusuan wai zijin) to raise funds for local 
development is a case in point. Under the name of extra-budget capital, local 
governments can impose various extra payments on enterprises within their 
jurisdictions so that a stable financial source is maintained for local 
construction. In some poor counties, these payments are even allotted to every 
household (Zheng 1992:227). This measure has also made it possible for 
reverting most transferred resource to local use. Moreover, since the leading 
cities levy, on behalf of the State, taxes and resources in their jurisdiction, 
they are in the position to bargain for a larger retainment ratio. In other words, 
13 Both white strip, green strip and red strip are bills of debt issued by different 
government authorities. White strip is for the procurement of agricultural products, 
green strip for telegraphic money order and red strip for labour salary. Due to cash 
problem, these strips are usually delivered as bills of debt. What is important about 
these bills is that the issuers seldom redeem them. 
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many rural resources, in the form of tax retention, can be transferred 
horizontally to the urban areas. 
From a document announced by the State Council in 1993, it was learnt 
that an unexpected total of 109 items of extra payment and fee was imposed 
on the rural areas nationally by various ministries Moreover, although the 
State stipulates that allotments and charges cannot exceed 5% of a peasant's 
net per capita income a year ago, the actual payment always exceeds that 
percentagei5. According to China's Rural Development Report (1994:160), the 
actual payment exceeded the upper limit by 2.67% in 1989. The percentages 
above the limit in 1990, 1991 and 1992 were 2.88%, 2.94% and 2.87%, 
respectively. An empirical study by the Ministry of Agriculture also shows 
that in 1991，a total of RMB 1.77 billion was allotted to the peasants as 
administratively related fee, RMB 2.31 billion for various kinds of fines, 
RMB 4.1 billion for fund raising and RMB 3.81 billion for other social 
expenditures (Li 1992:48). The per capita expenditure on collectively allotted 
payment has been increased from RMB 20.5 yuan in 1985 to 44.55 in 1991 
(Table 3.2), or an annual growth of 13.8%. These data are solid proof that 
more and more rural resources are being extracted from the rural areas. 
14 The document was announced in 22 July 1993. The objective is to abolish and 
review the various extra taxes and payments imposed by different ministries. The 
109 items listed in the document only represent the 丨丨written" ones. A considerable 
number of "unwritten" items, however, also exist. For the details of this document, 
see N.A. (1993). 
15 The relevant document was named "A notice to stop extravagant allotments and 
charges on peasants (Guanyu Zhizhi Xiang Nongmin Luantanpai Luanshoufei De 
Tongzhiy and announced in Feb. 1990. Some researchers, however, criticize that it 
is the omissions of this notice that have further exploited the interests of the peasants 
(Huang, 1994:38-40). 
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Table 3.2 Peasant's Expenditure on 
Collectively Allotted Payments, 1985-1991 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
per capita Expenditure 
on 
Collectively Allotted 20.50 22.83 25.62 28.86 33.84 41.15 44.55 
Payment 
(in RMB) 
as a % of Last Year's 
per capita Income 6.71 6.73 6.76 6.82 6.99 7.88 7.94 
Source: Li (1992:49). Table 3. 
It must be remarked, as Li (1992) does, that the statistics shown here 
are only the tip of an iceberg for two reasons. First, it is very difficult to have 
precise statistics on these fees, and second, some local payments have been 
excluded. These problems will be elaborated more clearly in Chapter 7，where 
we embark on a detailed study of the Sunan Area. 
3.6 Summary 
We have presented in the above the conceptual framework to unravel the GTR 
and resource transfer in China. A general discussion of the socialist economy 
opens up the elaboration of the concept of GTR in general. This concept is 
then further refined to apply to China. 
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We have argued that the Stalinist model of economic growth has 
reinforced the mechanism of GTR in China. This situation has not changed 
much even after the economic reform. The elaboration is finally refined 
withm the context of the regional administrative structure. It has found that 
the institutional reform of city-leading-counties in the 80s has altered the local 
government structure and thus affected the operation of GTR. There are two 
main arguments: 
(1) The institutional reform of city-leading-counties has restored the 
horizontal linkages. While the vertical linkage remains, the restoration has 
opened another channel for resource transfer. A "dual-transfer", the parallel 
operation of vertical and horizontal transfers of resource, is thus formed. 
(2) Institutional reform has also contributed to the localization of the GTR. 
The argument has two folds of meaning. Firstly, the GTR apparatus is now 
controlled by the local governments. Second, there is a retainment of 
resources for local development. The local governments have taken over the 
role formerly performed by the State. 
These two arguments have led us to conclude that more and more resources 
are transferred from the periphery (rural) to the core (urban) areas. As a 
summary, various forms of resource transfer in China are identified. The 
vertical transfers include formal taxes and resources derived from scissors 
differential, while the horizontal transfers include various extra payments 
imposed on the rural areas. This framework will be employed to understand 
the situation in Jiangsu province. Before doing so, we shall first turn to the 
operationalization of these concepts in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE CONCEPT 
OF GTR 
4.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to operationalize the concept of GTR. Based 
on the mathematical models on inter-sectoral resource flow (such as Ishikawa 
1967, Ellman 1975, Macrae 1979，Lardy 1983, Sheng 1993a, 1993b), the 
present work presents a more complicated situation in which inter-sectoral 
resource flow is put within the context of inter-regional flow. Unlike most of 
the pervious works, which focus mainly on the discussion of "appropriate 
price" (or real price), this chapter avoids this endless debate by not estimating 
such price. Section 4.2 examines the debate on price determination, while 
section 4.3 and 4.4 discuss methods of estimating the resource transfer as well 
as its magnitude of localization. Finally, some limitations on the estimation 
will be evaluated in the last section. 
4.2 On Methodology 
Since the concept of GTR is developed from the theory of unequal exchange, 
it is appropriate to start our discussion on its operationalization by elaborating 
what has been done for this theory. The theory of unequal exchange was 
originally presented by Emmanuel (1972) as an extension of Marx's 
transformation problem to the realm of international trade. Foot & Webber 
(1983, 1984), Marelli (1983), Gibson (1980), Weeks (1981), have attempted 
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to apply it to the economic reality by formulating different mathematical 
models. These models are based on the neo-classical economic assumptions 
such as free mobility of production factors, the absence of trade barriers and 
the prevalence of a "real price". 
It is Ishikawa's (1967) work that provides a useful framework for the 
measurement of inter-sectoral resource flow. He clearly defines that inter-
sectoral resource flow should be measured by the real values of commodity 
export and import and their net balance from a particular sector. Following his 
work, Ellman (1975), Mundle (1977), Macrae (1979), Sharpley (1979), Lardy 
(1983), Sheng (1993a, 1993b) have generalized various models to formulate 
the contribution of agricultural sector to industrial development. Their 
methodological frameworks are more or less the same though their definitions 
of inter-sectoral resource flow are different. 
One of the main tasks of the pervious works is to find an "appropriate 
price" so as to adjust the imperfect current price, thereby estimating the net 
resource flow. Because agricultural and industrial commodities are physically 
distinctive commodities, the balance of inter-sectoral trade cannot be 
calculated merely in physical terms. Economists generally agree that only an 
"appropriate price" can indicate the real resource flow. However, there are 
diverse opinions on the definition of "appropriate price". 
A majority of the literature views the free market price as the 
appropriate theoretical price, but it has two problems. Firstly, market price is 
the only observable price within the economy. Owing to the imperfect nature 
of the market, the direct consequence of market disturbances 16，this observable 
16 Such as trade barriers and monopoly. 
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price is unreliable. Secondly, market price is not theoretically and practically 
available in a planned economy. In dealing with the first problem，Sheng 
(1993a:31) agrees that "the perfect combination of these two opinions is that 
equilibrium price is the theoretically appropriate price and market price is the 
empirical approximation of equilibrium price". Regarding to the second 
problem, it is possible to "find the equilibrium price in a disequilibrium 
economy (planned economy)" (1993a:31). 
Sheng (1993a, 1993b) considers the subequilibrium price as the 
appropriate price for the estimation of inter-sectoral resource flow. Since a 
planned economy is characterized by imbalance growth and disequilibrium, 
the concept of subequilibrium can perfectly capture its equilibrium situation. 
One should notice that in such an economy, where prices are fixed during 
most of the times, the market clearing status (subequilibrium) reflects only the 
forced balance of demand and supply. The level of price where the planned 
supply and demand meet denotes the planned price only. So equilibrium, or 
subequilibrium, implies what agents expect to be and can be anything of our 
choice (Hare 1982, 1989:71). It is meaningless and cannot reflect the "market 
value" of the products. 
Komai (1980a, 1980b) has provided numerous insights on this issue in 
his classical book, Economics of Shortage. He argues that a planned economy 
is characterized by persistent shortage. The latter is caused by the behaviour of 
quantity drive. It is because in a planned economy, where the non-price 
control mechanism prevails, price plays only a secondary role. It is fixed in 
most of the time and plays no active role. Under this situation, the so-called 
"subequilibrium situation" is only a shortage equilibrium (forced balance). 
And it will be enforced and reproduced by the quantity driven behaviour of 
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different agents. So equilibrium in the planned economy is not the same as 
that of the market economy. It is a balance of force between demand and 
supply under a fixed price. The so-called "subequilibrium price", which does 
reflect the real market clearing situations, cannot be used as a price indicator 
for commodities. In short, it is misleading to use the concept of 
subequilibrium in explaining the economic situations in the planned economy. 
Although Sheng (1993a) claims that she has considered most 
characteristics of the planned economy in her methodology, some of her 
assumptions are in fact contradictory to the economic reality. Assumptions 
such as "prices are determined by markets" and "the motivation of both 
agricultural and non-agricultural firms is to maximize profit" are made, 
consciously or otherwise, in line with the philosophy of neo-classical 
economy. However, as mentioned before, price is determined administratively 
in the planned economy. It becomes impossible for firms to maximize profits 
since production is controlled administratively and set by quotas. Such 
assumptions violate the economic reality and are therefore unsuitable for 
estimating the inter-sectoral resource flow. 
It is worth mentioning that most Chinese economists generally agree 
that the labour embodied price is the most equitable real price. This concept is 
based on Marx's labour theory of value and closely related to the concept of 
unequal exchange (or scissors differential, see Fig. 4.1). However, most of the 
attention is focused on the existence and degree of scissors differential rather 
than its amounts. It is Li (1981) and Yan et al (1990) who have studied the 
issue thoroughly. They assume that price is determined by the amount of 
embodied labour, and attempt to convert agricultural labour and industrial 
labour into comparable terms, i.e. how much agricultural labour is required to 
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produce the same value of product as one industrial labour. The total real 
price can thus be calculated. 
Fig. 4.1 The Conceptual diagram of Scissors Differential 
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Real price 
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_ Time 
It is, however, difficult to evaluate labour embodied price in practice. 
Especially in a planned economy like China, there is no labour market to 
support appropriate signals for a price. Thus, labour wage is also under-
priced. However, the methods used are extremely controversial, and labour 
embodied price can function merely as a theoretical concept rather than a 
practical tool. To summarize, both the equilibrium theory and labour theory of 
value are found insufficient to explain the reality in the planned economies. It 
meant that the existing literature cannot offer any hint to resolve the issue of 
estimating the real price. 
4.3 The Measurement of Resource Transfer 
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Due to the limited scope of this study, and having considered the economic 
characteristics of the planned economy, we decided not to estimate the real 
price. Instead we shall establish a general method to estimate the resource 
transfer. 
Our method is not merely a measurement of spatial equality and 
interaction. It reveals a more complicated situation in which inter-sectoral 
resource flow is put under the context of the inter-regional flow. While it 
relies on Sheng (1993a), who has established a useful framework to estimate 
the net real inter-sectoral resource flow (NRIRF), this method has abandoned 
some of her unrealistic assumptions and presented a more realistic estimation 
based on available statistical data. 
To avoid confusion in later analysis, some specific terms need 
immediate clarification. The term ”real price” is used to indicate a 
commodity's theoretic worth or its capacity to claim for other commodity, 
whereas ”market price" is the price that transactions actually use in a market. 
So in a market economy, market price can be observed and statistically it is 
the current price. This is not true in a centrally planned economy, where 
current price is not the market price as defined here but the ”planned price”. 
Recollect that the mechanism of GTR contributes to two types of 
transfer in China. Here we denote resource transfer via the price mechanism 
as GTRi and that via government taxes and payments as GTR2. In most 
Chinese literature (such as Gao & Xiang 1992), the former, which is 
considered as a hidden tax of the rural areas, is the dominant channel of 
resource transfer. The latter can be defined as the over-levied agricultural tax 
besides formal tax and is observed in post-reform China. 
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4.3.1 Resource Transfer via the Price Mechanism (GTR!) 
Assume that a closed economy like China can be clearly divided into the rural 
and the urban regions. Both agricultural and non-agricultural activities are 
found in the rural, while only non-agricultural activities are in the urban. 
There is no distinction on the supply and exchange of agricultural and non-
agricultural products across sectors. Also, since the economy is divided into 
two regions only, inputs to the rural region are thus the output of the urban 
region，and vice versa (see Fig. 42). As mentioned in the above section, prices 
in a planned economy are under State control, the current price is equivalent 
to the planned price, something more rigid than the market price in market 
economies. Thus, the planned price departs greatly from the real price, if any, 
of a product. 
Evidences show that agricultural products are indeed under-priced in 
China. "Under-priced" here means that the planned prices of agricultural 
products are far below their market price (see Table 4.1). A majority of the 
agricultural products were priced administratively in the 1950si7. In 1956, all 
agricultural products were classified into three categories according to their 
importance to the economy. Category I，the most important products such as 
grain and cotton, was subject to "unified purchase" (tonggou) by the State. 
Category II, the subsidized products such as pork and eggs was subject to 
17 Grain and oil were put under the system of unified purchase in 1953, cotton in 
1954 and pig in 1955. From 1953 to 1956’ over hundreds of agricultural products 
such as tea, sugar cane, silkworm cocoon and Chinese medicines were put under 
similar administrative control. 
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"allotted purchase" (paigou) and unified purchase by relevant departments. 
Category III was the minor local products subject to "negotiated purchase" 








^ ^ Inter-regional Resource Flow 
_ — - Inter-sectoral Resource Flow 
(yigouY^. In other words, only agricultural products belonging to the final 
category - not too many in number - could be subject to forces closest to the 
market. 
Having made these clarifications, we can now construct the balance 
account of GTRj. Let us return to the two-region model mentioned early, and 
18 A detailed description of this issue can be found in Gao & Xiang (1992:7-29). 
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Table 4.1 The Free Market Price as an Index of the Planned 
Price of Consumption Goods* 
Year Year Ye^ Y ^ 
1962 270.0 1979 157.0 1984 143.0 1989 112.0 
1975 184.0 1980 148.0 1985 128.0 1990 107.7 
1976 190.0 1981 149.0 1986 117.0 1991 105.2 
1977 179.0 1982 148.0 1987 117.0 
1978 169.0 1983 148.0 1988 117.0 
* The planned price as 100 in the same year 
Source: Guojia Tongjiju (1992:254), Table 7-14. 
focus on the Rural region. Let P^ be the planned price of agricultural 
products for quantity Q^ and Pi be that of non-agricultural products for 
quantity Qi. 
Besides, let "U" denotes the urban region and "R" its rural counterpart, 
and "UR" the directional flow from U to R , and ”RU" from R to U. Owing to 
the underpriced problem, rural China's commodity balance account in 
monetary value should be: 
(4.1) Pi Q i U R � P a QaRU 
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Put differently, it looks like the following, if import excess represents the 
amount of money required to buy out the over-priced imports: 
(4.2) Pi Q^UR - Pa q^RU 二 import excess 
Given that both agricultural and non-agricultural activities are found in the 
rural region, one has to take into consideration the inter-sectoral flows in the 
commodity balance account and refine it accordingly. The total exports of the 
rural region include the outputs of agricultural products, P^Qa^, and of non-
agricultural products, PiQiRU The inter-sectoral flow of agricultural 
commodities to the non-agricultural activities, PaQa^^^ represents one of the 
inputs. (Henceforth, we shall, for the sake of clarification, highlight the inter-
sectoral resource flows in italics.) The other input, PjQjUR^ can be further 
sub-divided into PiQiUR(a) and PiQiUR(i), with the former capturing the 
non-agricultural input to the agricultural sector and the latter the non-
agricultural input to the non-agricultural sector. Before defining the inter-
sectoral flow from non-agricultural to agricultural sectors, it is necessary to 
clarify another point first. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, whether rural non-agricultural activities 
contribute to resource loss depends on their nature. We have identified two 
cases in which (1) rural non-agricultural activities are subordinated to the 
urban industries, and (2) rural non-agricultural activities occupy the same 
position as those in the urban region. 
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To put this point in our current language, let us define Pi" as the price 
of the rural non-agricultural products suppressed by the urban industries. This 
price, however, does not apply to Case (2), where both rural non-agricultural 
activities and urban industries enjoy the same position. In other words, there 
are three different prices in Case (1) and only two in Case (2). 
In Case (1), the commodity balance account for the rural agricultural 
sector is: 
(4 .3 ) [Pi Q i U R ( a ) + P i " QiRR] - [P^ Q ^ R U + p ^ qRR^ 
=Import excess (1) 
and that of the rural non-agricultural activities is: 
(4 .4 ) [Pi Q i U R � + P � q R R ] - P i " Q i R U + P i " Q 产 R] 
=Import excess (2) 
For the agricultural sector, industrial products are imported at price P^  from 
the urban industrial sector and at Pi" from rural non-agricultural sector. 
Meanwhile, for the rural non-agricultural sector, inputs include an intra-
regional flow at Pa from the agricultural sector and an inter-regional flow at Pj 
from the urban industrial sector. Outputs include rural non-agricultural 
products as inter- and intra- regional flows at Pj". 
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In Case (2), where Pi" does not apply, the commodity balance account 
for the agricultural sector becomes 
( 4 . 5 ) [Pi Q i U R ( a ) + P^Q^RR] . [P^ Q ^ R U + p ^ q R R ^ 
=Import excess (1) 
Similarly, the commodity balance account for the rural non-agricultural sector 
is: 
( 4 . 6 ) [Pi Q i U R ( i ) + P^ qRR] - [Pi Q i R U + p^q.RR^ 
- Import excess (2) 
In both cases, the total import excess of the rural region is the sum of Import 
excess (1) and (2). Thus, the total import excess for Case (1) is 
( 4 . 7 ) [ P i Q i U R ( a ) + P i Q i U R ( i ) + / V ' f t•及尺 + P a Q a ^ ^ ^ _ 
[PaQa^U + p^uQ-RU + P^qJ^R + p-nQ-RR^ = Import excess 
or 
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(4.8) [PiQiUR(a) + P i Q i U R � ] . [ P ^ Q ^ R U + P^.Q^RUJ 
=Import excess 
The total import excess for Case (2) is 
(4 .9 ) [ P i Q i U R ( a ) + P i Q i U R ( i ) + p^Q-RR + P ^ Q R R ] . 
[PaQaRU + PiQiRU + p ^ q R R + p^Qm^ = Import excess 
or 
(4.10) [PiQiUR(a) + PiQiUR(i)] . [P^Q^RU + P^Q^RUJ 
=Import excess 
Fig. 4.3 and 4.4 summarize the succinct features of this discussion in graphic 
forms. . 
4.3.2 Resource Transfer via Taxes and Payments (GTR�) 
Another important contributor of resource transfer is governmental taxes and 
payments. A similar concept is given by Tang (1991). Using the terminology 
of “ revenue transfer ’丨，he argues that coastal resources are transferred to the 
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Fig. 4.3 Imports and Exports of the Rural Agricultural Sector 
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mland area. Taxes play an important role in the operation of revenue transfer 
because taxes are considered as a media for resource redistribution. 
Someone may argue, however, that taxes cannot be claimed as a form 
of resource transfer because taxes are not only paid by one particular sector 
also by other sectors. Macrae's (1979) study of early industrialization strategy 
in China has shed some lights on this issue. If it is over-levied and paid 
without compensation, agricultural tax is considered as a concrete form of 
resource transfer. 
In China, taxes as a kind of resource transfer mainly take the form of 
extra taxes and payments. Before the economic reform, tax as a kind of rural 
resource transfer was not obvious, because agricultural tax was levied in the 
rural areas only. The average tax rate was 15.5%, which had not been changed 
since 195819. After the economic reform, although there is little change in the 
proportion of agricultural tax in the State's total revenues (which accounts for 
about 30% of the total tax revenues (Guojia Tongjiju 1992:219)), the rapid 
development of rural non-agricultural activities contributes to a sharp increase 
in the industrial and business tax revenues. In additional, there are those 
exorbitant levies by the local governments. Taxes as a kind of rural resource 
transfer are more obvious. The contrast is more remarkable when the State's 
agricultural investment decreased sharply in the post-reform period (from 5% 
of the total investment in the sixth FYP (1981-1985) to only 3.3% in the 
seventh FYP (1986-1990) (Guojia Tongjiju 1992:158, table 5-18)). 
19 Though the average agricultural tax rate was 15.5%, the practical tax rate 
(zhixing shuilu) was even somewhat lower. According to Wu et al (1988:408), the 
practical tax rate was about 10.6% to 11% after 1961; today the practical tax rate is 
about 8% to 9%. Local governments are allowed to levy an additional tax of 15-30% 
on the normal tax rate. 
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Theoretically, the amount of resource transfer in the form of G T R � in 
the rural area can be conceptualized by the following equation: 
(4.11) State Investments - Tax & Extra Payment levied 
二 Import excess 
State investments include formal and informal ones. The former is the official 
investments i.e. within budget, and the latter is an extra-budget {yusuanwai) 
capital including the subsidies on large scale irrigation projects and subsidies 
for losses due to natural disaster. Tax & extra payment levied also include two 
parts: the formal agricultural tax/industrial and commercial tax and the 
various kinds of exorbitant levies. However, there are always difficulties of 
identifying the latter due to their local nature - they vary from one province to 
another. 
4.4 Sketching the Picture of Resources Localization 
Recall the argument that the institutional reform has localized the transfer 
mechanism. More and more resources of a rural area are kept within its 
corresponding leading city. However, the estimations of GTRj and GTR) only 
show the total amount of resources extracted from the rural area, but not its 
spatial distribution. Thus, it is important to identify the destination of these 
transferred resources so as to complete the argument. The most appropriate 
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method is to multiply each county's GTR amount by a ratio, something that 
best represents the city/county's financial localization. 
Theoretically, the extra-budget capitals are the best indicator for 
investigating financial localization. While the budget {yusuannei) capitals 
represent only the fiscal allocation by the State, the extra-budget capitals can 
be interrupted as the "private" budgets of local governments. They are beyond 
the control of the budgets and are collected and administrated by local 
governments, departments and enterprises��. The amount of extra-budget 
capitals in 1978 was approximate 31% of the total budget capitals and the 
percentage increased to 89.7% in 1988 (Wei et al 1992:281). This increase 
reflects the enlargement of financial power of the local governments. So, the 
ideal method of depicting localization is to multiply the total GTR amount by 
the share of extra-budget revenues in the total budget revenues (the budget 
plus the extra-budget) of the local governments. However, data and studies on 
extra-budget are rare; local governments usually treat the data as a top secret 
and therefore are unwilling to reveal them. In short, we can only depict 
localization using the available budget data. 
Owing to data problem, we can only get hold of data on the financial 
localization of different amounts of local expropriation. Although revenue and 
expenditure are now demarcated into the local and the central sources, the 
local governments are still required to fulfill financial targets and remit a 
proportion of their income revenues to the State. Provincial governments then 
20 The extra-budget capitals are characterized by their independence and 
diversification. Independence means that extra-budget capitals are administered by 
local departments. The objective is to increase local incentives. Therefore, extra-
budget capitals are diversified at different local departments (Cheng & Wang 
1989:12-3). 
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set their budgets with reference to the allotted financial targets allocated by 
the Ministry of Finance. A proportion of the budget revenues is remitted to the 
State. The actual amounts differ from province to province and are calculated 
by different systems2 丨.In general, the amount of expropriation is determined 
by the expropriation and retaining ratios, which are fixed according to the 
province's financial record. 
The amount of revenues actually expropriated from a city or county can 
be estimated from by its planned budget�� . Since the local budget means the 
fiscal assignment of the State, it is always in balance. Deficit financing only 
occurs during natural hazards. So the amount of revenues actually 
expropriated can be detected by deducting the budget expenditures, Bg, from 
the budget revenues, B^. A coefficient, a, which indicates the proportion of 
revenues expropriated in the budget revenues, can be obtained by the 
following formula: 
B r - B e 
= a 
(4.12) Br 
By multiplying the coefficient by the total GTR (i.e. GTRj + GTR〗)，we are 
able to obtain a better picture of resource localization. 
21 There are in total six forms of financial remittance format between the State and 
the 30 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions (ZZRSB, 14 Nov., 1991). 
22 In general the retaining and expropriation ratios will be reviewed once every 
three years. 
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4.5 The Technical Problems of Operationalization 
The method outlined here is more advanced than the conventional wisdom 
because most characteristics of the planned economy have been considered. 
But, there are trade off. Since its lacks a "control point" (the real price), the 
estimation will be less precise. Nevertheless, one should notice that estimation 
employing the "real price" has also encountered the same problem of 
inaccuracy. It is then worthwhile adopting a more realistic theoretical 
framework that gives up the "real price" calculation. 
Besides, owing to the complexity of the economic reality in post-
reform China, the method of estimation can never be perfect, and GTR cannot 
be precisely estimated. What we can comment here is that our guess, which 
has taken most characteristics of the centrally planned economy into 
consideration, is superior. 
4.6 Summary 
A few formulae for the estimation of the amount of resource transfers under 
the mechanism of GTR have been presented in this chapter. In general, they 
share the characteristic of ignoring the unrealistic neo-classical economic 
assumptions Besides, they have taken into consideration most of the 
characteristics of the planned economy. Two types of resource transfer, GTR! 
and GTR2, have been identified. GTRj estimates the transfers contributed by 
the price mechanism and GTR� those via taxes and extra payments. For the 
former, the estimation is based on a balanced account of urban and rural trade, 
whereas for the latter, it is based on the subtraction of tax and payment levied 
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on the rural (i.e. output) from the State investment (i.e. input). Finally, a ratio 
of revenues expropriated to the budget revenues is concluded be the feasible 
method at hand to estimate the amount of resources transferred from a rural 
area that is actually retained within its corresponding leading-city region. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE SUNAN AREA: A DESCRIPTION OF THE SETTING 
5.1 Definition 
Sunan Area, literally a region in the southern part of Jiangsu province, lacks 
an indisputable geographical definition. Various studies have put forward 
different definitions almost at their own discretion. In their comparative study 
of Zhujiang and Chan^iang deltas, Pannell and Veeck (1989) have confused 
Sunan with Changjiang delta. Besides, in Gu et aL's (1988)，Pei et ai:s (1993), 
Sen's (1990:152-167) and Tao's (1988) studies on the Sunan model, Sunan is 
restrictively referred to Suzhou City, Wuxi City, Changzhou City and their led 
counties. Moreover, if someone uses Changjiang as a spatial divide to 
delineate the Sunan area, it includes the Suzhou LC, Wuxi LC, Changzhou 
LC, Chengjiang LC and part of Nanjing LC, while excluding Liuhe and 
Jiangpu counties of Nanjing LC. Furthermore, in the concept of the locale, 
Sunan refers to the four LC of Suzhou, Wuxi, Changsu and Nantong (Fei & 
Luo 1988:40-83). Finally, some scholars even exclude Nantong LC as part of 
the Sunan Area. What is clear from the above is that there are diverging 
definitions of the Sunan Area. 
Fei Xiaotong (1985, 1986, 1989), who has spent decades in studying 
Jiangsu, provides a more authoritative definition of the Sunan Area. Since 
economic development within Jiangsu is extremely imbalance, with northern 
Jiangsu in general being less developed and poorer than its southern 
counterpart, it is important for policy implications to group areas with similar 
economic development together using appropriate criteria. His research 
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advises that the proportion of the gross values of agricultural and industrial 
output in the total gross values and the level of small town development in an 
area are important criteria (Fei 1985:87). Based on his experience and advice, 
the author has divided Jiangsu into three areas, namely Subei (northern 
Jiangsu), Suzhong (middle Jiangsu) and Sunan (southern Jiangsu). The Sunan 
Area, the focus of this research, comprises the six counties (and cities) of 
Changshu, Zhangjiagang, Kunshan, Taicang, Wu and Wujiang under the 
administrative jurisdiction of Suzhou City, the three counties (and cities) of 
Jiangyin, Yixing and Wuxi under Wuxi City, and the three counties (and 
cities) of Qidong, Nantong and Haimen under Nantong City. (Map 5.1) It has 
a total area of about 16683.12 square km and a population of over 12 million 
in 1992. 
5.2 Basic Socio-Economic Characteristics 
The Sunan Area is located in the lower Changjiang Delta, one of China's most 
important and developed regions. As early as the mid-19th century, the 
Changjiang Delta region was the leading zone of economic growth and the 
most urbanized region in the country (Skinner 1977). During the Treaty port 
phase (1842-1945), Shanghai and Nanjing, now the provincial capital of 
Jiangsu, were designated as treaty ports. The busy transportation between 
these two cities and the influx of foreign capital and technology had 
stimulated local economic growth and thus urbanization. Shanghai had even 
developed as the local center of Changjiang region and the national center of 
international trade (Murphey 1974). Sunan's geographical proximity to 




































































































































































































interaction with international economy as well as substantial trade with 
China's inland areas (Faure 1978). 
The Sunan Area has therefore developed into the "home of fish and 
rice’' and "home of arts and crafts". Its rural economy has a strong tradition of 
sideline production and handicraft industries. During the 70s, rural 
industrialization took place in Sunan's countryside (Fei 1986, Mok 1987’ Sen 
1990，Tang 1990b); Shegang village in 1975, and Wu county around the same 
time. By the early 80s, over 50% of the area's gross value of industrial output 
was contributed by the township and village industries. Rural industries have 
become the dominant profit maker of the Sunan Area. In Wuxi LC, Suzhou 
LC and Nantong LC, the village industries made up 2.7%, 3.62% and 3.61% 
of their respective LCs gross value of industrial output in 1970. Their 
respective shares increased to 15.21%, 16.73% and 17.85% in 1980 and 
36.31%, 44.58% and 33.82% in 199223. The annual growth rates, in terms of 
the value of rural industrial output, for 1984，1985, 1987 and 1988 were 55%, 
71%, 36% and 47%, respectively (Pei et al 1993:117). 
The rapid development of township and village industries in the Sunan 
Area has spurred the growth of its whole rural economy, a phenomenon well 
known as the "Sunan model" of rural development in the literature. In Suzhou 
LC, for instance, a total tax payment of RMB 531 million, which accounted 
for 1/3 of the LCs total revenues in 1985, was contributed by industries at the 
village level and below. An annual increase of 47% was also reported in Wuxi 
county in 1985 (Tao 1988:10). Fei (1986), in describing the conditions that 
contributed to the rapid rural industrialization in this area, has highlighted 
23 The percentages were calculated from data collected in Nantongshi Tongjiju 
(1993:281,283). 
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three basic factors: a large and growing rural population; a paucity of good 
farmland; and a tradition of supplementing household income with handicraft 
production or other sideline activities. 
In general, the rural economy of the Sunan Area can be characterized 
by three salient features: 
1. It is dominated by the township and village industries. In Wuxi 
LC, only 0.838% of its gross value of industrial output in 1962 was 
contributed by industries at the village level. Its share only increased to 1.05% 
in 1965 and 2.70% in 1970. In 1992, the share reached a high level of 36.31% 
(see Fig. 5.1). Similar development processes have been recorded in both 
Suzhou and Nantong LCs (see Fig 5.2 and 5.3). At the county level, take Wu 
county, a led county of the Suzhou LC, as an illustration. In 1963, the 
township and village enterprises accounted for only 1.6% of its value of 
industrial output (Wuxian Tongjiju 1989:34-5). This share increased to about 
25% in the 70s and has continued to increase since then (see Fig. 5.4). In 
1992, the gross value of industrial and agricultural output of Wu county was 
about RMB 21,464 million, over 78% of which came from the industrial 
sector and only 7% from the agricultural sector. Out of the total of the 5,637 
industrial enterprises, 5,492 belonged to the levels of townships, villages and 
below. The latter accounted for almost 84% of the total value of industrial 
output and 81.5% of the total profit and tax (lishui). This picture is even more 
vivid at the town and village levels. In Cangshu town, one of the 34 towns of 
Wu county, there were 99 township and village enterprises in 1992. They 
accounted for 96% of the total value of industrial output and contributed to a 
profit and tax of RMB 10.84 million (see Table 5.1 for details). 
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Concerning the industrial structure, both heavy and light industries 
exist in the Sunan Area. In terms of gross value of industrial output, each 
branch of industry made up 50% of the total in 1989 (Pei et al 1993:126). 
Processing industries, with its raw materials from either the agricultural or the 
non-agricultural base, dominate the industrial structure. In general, they 
include textiles, machinery, chemical, metal smelting, building materials and 
non-metal processing. 
Fig. 5.1 Contribution of the Village-level Industries to the 
Gross Value of Industrial Output in the Wuxi LC, 1957-1992 
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Source: Nantongshi Tongjiju (1993:281, 283). 
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Fig. 5.2 Contribution of the Village-level Industries to the 
Gross Value of Industrial Output in the Suzhou LC，1957-1992. 
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Source: Nantongshi Tongjiju (1993:281, 283). 
Fig. 5.3 Contribution of the Village-level Industries to the 
Gross Value of Industrial Output in the Nantong LC*, 1957-1992 
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Source: Nantongshi Tongjiju (1993:281, 283). 
94 
Fig 5.4 Contribution of the Township and Village Enterprises to 





30 - ^ ^ 
a ^ — 丨 — I — I — I — I — I — I — I — I — I — I — I 
Year 
Source: Wuxian Tongjiju (1989:37, 1991:91，1993:91) 
Table 5.1 Performance Characteristics of the Township & Village 
Enterprises in Cangshu Town, 1988-1992 
No. of 
Township Gross Value Amount of 
& Village oflnd. Profit & Tax 
Year Enterprises Output Created 
(RMB million} (RMB million) 
1988 16 139.83 3.82 
1990 77 165.72 5.72 
1992 99 333.10 10.84 
Source: Wuxian Tongjiju (1989:120,244; 1991:56,116; 1993:48,112) 
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2. In terms of ownership, the collective economy occupies the 
dominant position. In Wuxi City and Suzhou City, about 90% of their rural 
gross value of agricultural and industrial output are accounted for by the 
collective economy, leaving about 10% to the household economy (Tao 
1988:7). In fact, the development of household economy has been slow in the 
Siman Area. Most rural industries are collectively owned and run by the 
township and village governments. In Shegang village, for example, almost all 
enterprises are collectively owned, with a village population of 300 only (out 
of a total of 1,670) being involved in household economy. 
3. There is a close linkage between rural industries and agricultural 
activities. First, various types of service organization have been set up to meet 
the needs of agricultural production. For instance, there is an agricultural 
service station supplying the peasants with seeds, manure, fertilizer and 
pesticides, etc. during the various stages of agricultural production. Second, 
most agricultural taxes and service charges levied by various government 
departments are paid by the rural enterprises (Fieldwork 1993). Third, 
industries tend to spend a considerable proportion of their profits on the 
agricultural sector. This is known as "use industries to support agricultural 
activities" (yigong bunong). From 1979 to 1982, more than 20% of the profits 
made by the province's township and village industries were spent on 
agriculturally related activities such as buying farm machines, carrying out 
farmland construction and providing social welfare facilities. According to Fei 
(1986:70), this sum, which totaled RMB 1,450 million, was equaled to the 
total State investment in agriculture, forestry, water conservancy and 
meteorology in the province during the same period. The situation is similar in 
the Sunan Area. From 1979 to 1984，the township and village enterprises had 
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spent about 20% of their net profits on the above items (Yu 1992:100). The 
practice of Wuxi LC is another case in point. During the sixth FYP (1981-
1985), the township and village enterprises have spent an average of 22.35% 
of their net profits to support agricultural activities. While a maximum figure 
of 34.22% was reached in 1982, a minimum of 10.95% was recorded in 1985 
(see Fig 5.5). 
Fig 5.5 Agricultural Expenditure as a Percentage of the Net Profit 
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5.3 Summary: Implications for the Operation of GTR 
The above description has clearly shown that the Sunan Area is a special 
region of China. It has its own history of development; its economy has 
exhibited characteristics different from those of other regions; and the 
relationship between the urban and the rural and their interaction are different 
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too. These peculiarities are spatial contingent conditions, which can affect the 
operation of the nation-wide mechanism of GTR: the way the mechanism 
actually works and the magnitude of resources transferred. Specifically, one 
expects the following implications for the operation of the GTR: 
(i) The prosperous rural economy lays down the favourable conditions 
to increase the amount of resource transferred. First, there are more resources 
available for transfer due to the sheer wealth generated by the economy. 
Under the system of financial decentralization, the local governments, which 
are desperate to search for more financial sources (for local constructions), 
would find the prosperous Sunan rural economy the best warrantee for local 
government's tax revenues. Accordingly, one expects more resources being 
transferred out of Sunan's rural regions than those in other parts of China. 
Second, there are more channels available to transfer resources outward. The 
increase in urban-rural linkages has provided additional exchange channels in 
the sphere of circulation. Besides, the growing industrial activities in the rural 
region may form another channel. Here, we refer to a production process in 
which raw materials and resources from the agricultural sector will be 
processed as semi-finished products by the rural industries for final processing 
in the urban region. In other words, resources from the agricultural sector will 
be transferred to the urban region via the mediator of rural industries. As a 
result, more resources will be leaked outward through these new channels, if 
everything being held constant. 
(ii) The huge financial support provided by the growing rural 
industrial sector to the agricultural activities imply that the amount of 
resources transferred out of the agricultural sector via the price mechanism 
may be less than the situation with minimal support. There is a chance that the 
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loss in resources to the urban region may be canceled out by the subsidies 
furnished by the rural non-agricultural activities. 
(Ill) The dominance of collective ownership has rendered the transfer 
channels more formal and the resource flow more steady. Collective 
ownership in the Sunan Area means ownership and administration by 
township and village governments. This obscurity in property rights has made 
most production enterprises vulnerable to the intervention of local 
governments. The latter intervene into the decisions concerning investment, 
profit distribution, personnel matters and property allocation. Government 
administration is thus merged with economic management. In terms of the 
GTR, resource transfer can be manipulated administratively by the local 
governments, which stipulate horizontal linkages between the urban and the 
rural. Accordingly, the transfer channels are much more formalized than those 
operated under household economy. Given these more formalized channels, 





ESTIMATION OF RESOURCE TRANSFER & 
LOCALIZATION IN THE SUNAN AREA 
6.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to apply the method developed in Chapter 4 to 
measure the magnitudes of rural resources being transferred via different 
channels in the Sunan Area. Owing to data problem, it is impossible to 
estimate GTR〗； instead, only GTRi and its resource localization will be 
estimated. We shall leave the analysis of these estimations to the next chapter. 
6.2 The Estimation of GTRj 
This section consists of two parts. First rural commodity accounts of 1979, 
1986, 1990 and 1991 will be constructed based on the current prices. It 
involves the selection of data from statistical yearbooks and classifying them 
into relevant categories of inputs and outputs in accordance with the more 
conceptual discussion presented in Chapter 4. Second, to eliminate the effect 
of inflation, adjustment will be made on these rural commodity accounts by 
the base-year method. It is hoped that this adjustment will enable us to 
estimate, in real term, the resources transferred from the rural to the urban. 
(5.2.1 The Rural Commodity Accounts of GTR j 
100 
A few points of clarification must be settled first. A rural commodity account 
documents the inter-sectoral and inter-regional trades between the rural and 
the urban. In practice, it is difficult to divide the economy into urban and 
rural. In this study, for the sake of handling statistical data, we define 
consumption and production expenditures by rural households "rural" and 
those by urban households "urban". Besides, the account will deal with three 
economic sectors, namely the urban industrial sector, the (rural) agricultural 
sector and the rural non-agricultural sector. Moreover, it is necessary to define 
clearly what is meant by agriculture, since it carries two definitions in the 
Chinese statistics. One refers to farming only while the other includes 
farming, forestry, animal husbandry, sideline production and fishery {nong, 
//n，mu, fu，yu). The broader definition of agriculture has been employed in the 
following estimations. Similarly, the non-agricultural sector as defined here 
embraces rural industry, construction, transportation, and service activities. 
Recall the formulae of the rural commodity account outlined in Chapter 
4. The account is basically made up of inputs (PiQjUR(a), p^QjUR^j)) and 
outputs (PaQaRU, PiQiRU). One can further delineate 5 items to represent the 
inputs to activities in the rural areas. 
11. Consumption goods purchased. They are the total expenditures of rural 
households on clothing, foodstuff, housing and other daily necessities. They 
are listed under six headings in relevant statistical yearbooks: foodstuff, 
clothing, fuel, manufactured goods for daily use, other daily use and non-
commercial expenditures. 
12. Production goods Purchased. They represent the total expenditures on 
production goods in the rural areas. Theoretically they can be subdivided into 
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I2a and 12^ with the former referring to those purchases by the agricultural 
sector and the latter those by the rural non-agricultural sector. 12^ includes 
five categories: expenditures of rural electricity, machinery, fertilizers, farm 
insecticides, and others. 12[ consists of similar expenditures but for industrial 
consumptions. Due to a paucity of data, 12^ and I2i will not be separately 
calculated in the following estimations. 
13. State investment in terms of projects. This is the planned investments in 
the agricultural sector. Investments are usually allocated to various projects 
directly related to agriculture. Most of the investment goods needed for the 
projects are, however, not included in either the item of consumption goods or 
that of producer goods mentioned earlier. It is important to notice that state 
investments (at the national level) have decreased sharply in the past decade. 
In 1978, agricultural investments accounted for 10.6% of the state's total 
expenditures. The figure dropped to 3% in 1988. Even in 1984, the year with 
the highest productivity during the 80s, state agricultural investments 
accounted for only 5% of the total (Guojia Tongjiju 1992:158). Similarly, 
State investments in rural non-agricultural activities are rare. Especially in 
region like the Sunan Area, this type of investment is usually made up by the 
coiiective enterprises only. 
14. Raw materials from the agricultural sector. These resources are the 
direct inputs to the rural non-agricultural sector from the agricultural sector. 
This item is different from the raw materials to the urban industrial sector in 
that most of the transfers are not via the system of unified purchase and 
unified sale. 
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15. Inputs from the rural non-agricultural sector. An agricultural 
development fund, which draws on financial supports from various rural and 
township enterprises, is set up to purchase production goods or construct 
irrigation systems. It includes eight categories: purchase of farm machinery 
and equipment, construction of irrigation systems, agricultural technology 
equipment, establishment of agricultural services, subsidy to agricultural 
products, infrastructure construction in the rural areas, and others. 
With the exceptions of item 14 and 15, which denote the inter-sectoral flows of 
agricultural commodities and resources within the rural areas, the rest is 
industrial goods imported from the urban areas. 
The outputs in the account consist of 3 items: 
01 . State purchase of agricultural products. It is the major output item of 
the agricultural sector and the major contributor of resource transfer. 
02 . Free market sales. They represent gains of the rural area from selling 
either agricultural or non-agricultural products in the free market. It can be 
further divided into agricultural sales, 02^, and non-agricultural sales, 02[. 
The former is the incomes that the peasants earn by selling their agricultural 
products in either the urban free market or the rural free market. These 
products are sold at free-market prices (shijia), which are higher than the state 
purchasing prices. This source of income can only be found in the post-reform 
period. 02i is the incomes from selling rural non-agricultural products. 
03 . Agricultural tax in kind. Something valid before 1985，it was a tax 
levied on individuals and units which were engaged in agricultural production 
activities and which received income from farming. It was also called 
103 
� — — ” (grain delivered to the state) because grain was the basic item 
collected. Since then, this agricultural tax is paid in cash instead of in kind. 
The type of tax was also increased to include tax on commercial crops, animal 
husbandry tax and slaughter tax in 1983. Since the taxes are now paid m cash, 
they have been excluded from the commodity account. 
Having defined clearly which items of data in the statistical yearbooks are 
classified as various categories of inputs and outputs, it becomes a relatively 
easy job to compile the accounts. The rural commodity accounts in current 
price are shown in a series of table from Table 6.1 to Table 6.4. 
Before proceeding to other estimations, it is necessary to mention the 
data problems related to these accounts. Although we have tried very best to 
collect as much data, published or unpublished, as possible, some data 
requirements are still not yet met. In case the data are not available in the 
required format, they will be processed to fit into the accounts. For example, 
there are no data in the exact format required for the items of Consumption 
goods purchased (Ii), Production goods purchased (I2) and Free market sales 
(O2). What we did was to estimate these figures by multiplying the per capita 
variables - something obtained from the rural household surveys - by the rural 
populations. Another data problem is the inconsistency in the data. The rural 
economic reform does not only disintegrate the people's communes, but also 
induce changes in the accounting system. This has caused serious problems to 
the construction of time series accounts. The most noticeable data 
inconsistency would be between 1979, the beginning year of the reform and, 
say, 1990. Most data in the 1979 account are the provincial averages only. In 
comparison, data quality of the 1986 account has improved greatly. By 1990 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































commodity account of 1979 and those of other years are not directly 
comparable. The 1979 account, however, provides the best available 
approximation of the situation at the beginning of the reform, a situation on 
which to come to terms with temporal changes. Finally, we need not reiterate 
the warning made by others that, since the price index is not that reliable, its 
effects on real resource flow must be treated with caution (Sheng 1993a’ 
Lardy 1983, Wang 1985). 
6.2.2 Adjust the Rural Commodity Accounts by The Base-year Method 
The accounts constructed in the previous section are based on current prices. 
In order to eliminate the effects of inflation on pricing (especially the sky-
rocketed inflation in the mid 80s), the base-year method is employed to 
estimate the magnitude of urban-rural trade in real prices. This method uses 
various price indices to adjust the rural commodity accounts of 1979, 1986， 
1990 and 1991. Three pricing indices, which show the ratio of price variance 
over times, have been employed in the conversion process. Index 1 is the 
General Retail Price Index of Industrial Commodities in the Rural Areas 
{Nongcun Gongyepin Lingshoujia Zongzhishu). It shows the fluctuation in the 
retail prices of industrial commodities sold in the rural areas. Index 2，which 
is the General Index on State Procurement Prices of Farm and Sideline 
Products {Nongfuchanpin Shougoujia Zongzhishu), in fact captures the 
fluctuation in the planned price. Index 3, the General Price Index of Market 
Trading (Jishimaoyi Jiage Zongzhishu), reveals the fluctuation of the "free" 
market price. Moreover, to apply these indices to study the Sunan Area, 
official data from Jiangsu province have been used. (Guojia Tongjiju Maoyi 
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Wujia Tongjisi 1984:396, 428, 43; Jiangsusheng Tongjiju 1987:71, 1991:272, 
1992:301)24. 
Regarding the choice of the base-year, 1978, the watershed of China's 
economic reform, is obviously the ideal choice. Because prices before 1978 
were still controlled by the State, they had fluctuated marginally. For instance, 
from 1973 to 1978’ Index 1 remained consistently at the level of 100 (Ye 
1993:184). This consistency implied that retail prices of industrial 
commodities had not fluctuated. From 1979 to 1984, the State had started to 
adjust the planned prices of various industrial and agricultural commodities as 
well as the procurement prices of agricultural products. The radical pricing 
reform since 1985 has contributed to the "double-track" pricing system. More 
and more commodities have multiple prices, and prices in general, fueled by 
inflation, fluctuate with a much wider margin. In short, 1978 is the most 
appropriate base year to thoroughly reflect the changes in price during the 
economic reform. 
The base-year method fixes the 1978 level of three indices at 1 and 
adjusts values of other years accordingly. The complete series of these indices 
over the study period is listed in Table 6.5. These indices are used to convert 
value in the commodity accounts to their real value or value at 1978 
comparable prices. The immediate question is: which index for what item? 
After careful consideration, we find the following groups conceptually 
informed. Because item Ii, I2 and I3 are values of industrial commodities 
imported to the rural areas, they should be adjusted to real prices by Index 1; 
State procurement, Ol, by Index 2; and sales in free markets, 02, by Index 3. 
24 Due to a paucity of data, all three indices are based on provincial figures. 
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The rural commodity accounts in the real prices have been summarized in 
Tables 6.6 to 6.10. 
Table 6.5 Various Price Indices of Jiangsu Province, 
1979，1986，1990 and 1991 
(with 1978 as the base year) 
1979 1986 1990 1991 
Index 1 LOOl持 1.169 1.804 1.837 
Index 2 L171特 1.651 2.637 2.621 
Index 3 0.949^ 1.4W 2.613 2.725 
Note: # they are the average index of the country 
Source: Guojia Tongjiju Maoyi Wujia Tongjisi (1984: 396， 
428, 431); Jiangsusheng Tongjiju (1987:71, 
1991:272, 1992:301). 
6.3 Sketching the Picture of Resource Localization 
The picture of resource localization in the Sunan Area can be estimated by the 
method - county/city's revenue expropriation ratio - formulated in Chapter 4. 
The first thing to do in the estimation exercise is to select the 
appropriate ratio for different regions of Jiangsu province. The central-local 
fiscal relation between the State and Jiangsu has undergone a few changes in 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































— a n ) was introduced in Jiangsu from 1977 to 1987. In 1988, a more 
flexible fiscal responsibility system was introduced in 13 rich provinces 
including Jiangsu, Beijing, Liaoning etc. In general, the amount of remittance 
is determined by a remittance ratio and a retainment ratio, which are in turn 
set with reference to the province's financial record. Within Jiangsu, the 
centrally stipulated fiscal target has been allotted to different levels of local 
government by a responsibility system since 1982. Each county/county-level 
city needs to contribute a considerable amount of revenues to its leading city. 
The leading city then submits a proportion of the revenues to the provincial 
government and then to the State. Under this system, the budgets of local 
governments at all levels should be always in balance. In other words, the 
amounts of revenues expropriated can be detected from the budgets^s. 
For the purpose of estimation, these amounts can be re-calculated as 
the coefficient a, which indicates the proportions of revenues expropriated in 
the budget revenues of various cities and counties in the Sunan Area. Table 
6.10 summarizes these coefficients in 1986, 1990 and 1991. Resource 
localization is then estimated by multiplying these coefficients to the amounts 
of GTR of various years. Since only GTRj is available, the estimation of 
resource localization is therefore primarily based on it (see Table 6.11). 
The amount of revenue expropriated in fact depends on the remittance and 
retainment ratios. In general, the ratios will be reviewed once every three years. In 
Jiangsu, the ratios were reviewed in 1985, 1988 and 1991. In the 1985 review, the 
retainment ratios of each counties in Suzhou City are 17.5% in Changsu, 22% in 
Zhangjiagang, 29% in Kunshan, 19.5% in Taicang, 20.1% in Wu county and 20.3% 
in Wujiang (Fieldwork 1993). The ratios in Wuxi City are 19.13% in Wuxi county, 
17.77% in Jiangyin and 26.62% in Yixing (Yu 1992:98). 
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Table 6.10 The Coefficient a of Various 
Cities/Counties in the Sunan Area 
City/county in 1986 1990 1991 
1991* 
Wuxi City 0.77 0.73 0.67 
Jiangyin city 0.74 0.73 0.66 
Yixing city 0.59 0.56 0.48 
Wuxi county 0.74 0.74 0.69 
Suzhou City 0.70 0.64 0.58 
Changsu city 0.73 0.63 0.61 
Zhangjiagang 0.70 0.70 0.64 
city 
Kunshan city 0.62 0.43 0.34 
Taicang county OJO 0.61 0.53 
Wu county 0.69 0.63 0.55 
Wujiang county 0.69 0.63 0.56 
Nantong City 0.65 0.61 0.57 
Qidong city 0.49 0.41 0.33 
Nantong county 0.52 0.43 0.37 
Haimen county 0.50 0.42 0.38 
Note: * these administrative divisions were applied to 1991 only 
Source: Jiangsusheng Tongjiju (1987: 210-3, 216-8;1991:451-
2; 1992:237-8) 
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Table 6.11 Resources Transferred from Cities/Counties And 
Intercepted by Their Respective Leading-Cities, 
the Sunan Area, 1986，1990 & 1991 
City/ county* 1986 1990 1991 
Total of Wuxi LC'''^ 928.80 837.89 913.51 
Jiangyin city 348.57 227.52 329.95 
Yixing city 238.26 189.17 222.31 
Wuxi county 341.97 421.20 361.25 
Total of Suzhou LC** 983.30 1224.03 1275.67 
Changsu city 213.27 327.24 269.90 
Zhan^iagang city 204.03 284.71 315.39 
Kunshan city 66.53 99.55 74.06 
Taicang county 69.25 50.71 88.02 
Wu county 290.77 348.60 349.54 
Wujiang county 139.44 113.21 178.76 
Total of Nantong LC** 597.71 368.46 349.39 
Qidong city 110.08 83.40 100.27 
Nantong county 178.90 163.66 162.15 
Haimen county 108.73 121.40 86.97 
Note: * these administrative divisions were applied to 1991 
only 
** excluding the leading city 
6.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has further operationalized the equations formulated in Chapter 4 
by taking into consideration the socio-economic reality of the Sunan Area and 
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the data availability problem. G T R � cannot be estimated because data are 
fragmented and most of the information are qualitative. Thus the whole 
chapter was concerned with the estimation of GTR! and its resources 
localization. Rural commodity accounts have been established to estimate 
GTRi and coefficient a , a ratio of the revenues expropriated in the budget 
revenues, has been used to depict the picture of resource localization. 
In operating the GTR in the Sunan Area, several problems have been 
encountered. The most important is the problem of insufficient data. It affects 
the operationalization of the resource transfer in several ways. First, G T R � 
cannot be estimated because data on various kinds of exorbitant levies are 
scattered and intangible. Second, a temporally continuous picture cannot be 
sketched due to the lack of disaggregated data. Therefore only the years of 
1979’ 1986, 1990 and 1991 can be evaluated, and most of the data are average 
numbers. Third, owing to the change in statistical method and criteria, the 
account of 1979 is not comparable with those of 1986，1990 and 1991. The 
same problems occur in the estimation of resources localization. Owing to the 
lack of data on extra-budget revenues, a "second best" variable has been used. 
Nevertheless, this chapter has provided the best available estimations of 
resource transfer in the Sunan Area. 
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CHAPTER 7 
GTR IN THE SUNAN AREA 
7.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to analysis the results of GTR estimation 
presented in the pervious chapter. The discussion is divided into two main 
parts. First, the effects on the GTR as a result of the establishment of the city-
leading-counties administrative system will be discussed. Then, emphasis will 
be paid on the mechanism actual in operation To support my arguments, I 
have chosen the Shegang village of Cangshii town as an illustration. Shegang 
village, 18 km away from Suzhou City, is one of the 18 administrative 
villages {xingzheng cun) of Cangshu town. It is also administratively 
subordinated to Wu county (see Map 7.1). Its rural economy exhibits the 
typical characteristics of the Sunan Area, and therefore the case should serve 
the purpose of illustrating the operation of the GTR and resource transfers in 
this area. 
7.2 Administrative System Reform in Sunan and Its Effects on GTR: 
A Discussion of the Estimations 
Recollect that the system of city-leading-counties has restored the horizontal 
linkages between cities and counties. We can then talk of a "dual-transfer" of 
resources transfer; there is not only a vertical transfer of resources as in the 
pervious system, but also a horizontal transfer. Accordingly, the total amount 







































































































7.2.1 GTR Under the Traditional Administrative System 
The regional administrative system introduced in 1953 had delimited the rural 
and urban administrations in Sunan. Three prefecture-level cities, Suzhou, 
Wuxi and Nantong, were set up in Jan. 1953. They were subordinated under 
the provincial government of Jiangsu. Three administrative prefectures 
together with their prefecture agencies were also established in Suzhou, Wuxi 
and Zhenjiang. There were in these agencies total of 25 counties, 12 of which 
are included in our definition of the Sunan Area. A two-level administrative 
hierarchy of province and city/county was thus formed (Fig. 7.1). 
This system contributed to the functional specialization of the rural and 
the urban areas and then their horizontal dis-integration. Rural areas were 
designated as agricultural production bases only, and activities other than 
cultivation were eliminated. Obviously, the Sunan Area, which has a strong 
tradition of handicraft industries and sideline productions in its rural economy, 
suffered most under this system. Fei & Luo's (1988) study shows that rural 
Sunan was dominated by food crop cultivation after collectivization in the late 
50s. Ma et al ’s (1990:153) study on agricultural development in Taihu 
region26 shows that the output of silkworm cocoon dropped from 30,300 tons 
in 1952 to 13,010 tons in 1961. Similarly, the output of tea also decreased 
from 1,508 tons in 1959 to 939 tons in 1962 (1990:165-6). Moreover, 
activities such as silkworm breeding, family handicraft and household sideline 
production were strictly prohibited. In some major handicraft town such as 
Shengze, workers were moved to cities such as Suzhou City (Huang 
1993:104). Various government agencies were established in the rural area to 
26 Taihu region refers to the Sunan area plus Shanghai Municipality, Hangzhou 
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Fig 7.1 The Administrative Hierarchy of Cities & Counties 
in The Sunan Area, 1953-1982 
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supervise the procurement of food crops and raw materials. All agricultural 
products such as food crops, cotton, silkworm cocoon and other raw material 
were purchased and distributed by the State. 
The rapid decrease in the number of designated towns (jianzhizhen) 
provides further evidence of the dis-integration of the rural and the urban. In 
1953, there were 107 designated towns in the area. The number decreased to 
84 in 1958 and 32 in 1975. In the early 80s, only 10 of them were left 
(Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minzhengbu 1982:25, 1983:26). An obvious 
drop in the number of towns was observed in the counties of Jiangyin, Wuxi 
and Wujiang. For those towns that remained, population decreased sharply 
and became ruralized. For example, in Luzhi town of the Wu county, a total 
population of 9,600 was recorded in 1949. It decreased to about 5,000 in the 
late 70s. In 1957, there were 81 professions, 637 shops and about 400 
individual peddlers; only 12 shops remained in 1979. All other service 
industries were eliminated. Similar development have been reported in 
Dangkou town and Ganlu town of Wuxi county and Dongshan town of Wu 
county (Ma et al. 1990:98). 
Since activities other than cultivation were eliminated in the rural area, 
other channels for resource transfer were eliminated too. Moreover, only 
vertical relationships existed between regions under the rigid administrative 
system. GTR in Sunan therefore followed this vertical channel transferring 
most of the resources from the rural areas, and the system of unified purchase 
and unified sale was the major contributor. In 1979, every administrative unit 
suffered a loss, contributing to a total loss in resources via GTRj reaching 
RMB 1435.88 million. While the cities of Wuxi, Suzhou and Nantong still 
suffered a small loss of RMB 26.13 million, 18.1 million and 23.67 million, 
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respectively, the rural areas (counties) suffered a grave loss from RMB 50.14 
million (Kunshan county) to 190.54 million (Nantong county) (see also Map 
7.2). 
Cities of Wuxi, Suzhou and Nantong, which benefited most from 
resource transfer, soon developed their industries rapidly. Their chemical 
industries, machinery industries, textile industries grew rapidly. In Wuxi city, 
for example, the 116 former textile mills were incorporated into 16 spinning 
and weaving factories and 4 reeling factories. New power plants, pressure 
press industries, water pump factories, machine tools factories, diesel engine 
factories had been established (Dangdai Zhongguo Congshu Bianji 
Weiyuanhui 1989b:360). The share of industrial sector in the city's national 
income was increased from 28.8% in 1949 to 68.3% in 1978 (Wuxishi 
Tongjiju 1992:29). Heavy industries grew at an annual rate of 13.64%. The 
same industrial structure was also established in Nantong city and Suzhou 
city. In the 50s, all the textile industries in Nantong city and their 15,000 
labourers were located in the city districts. And the gross production value of 
heavy industries had increased from RMB 2.18 million in 1952 to RMB 
766.98 million in 1978 (Nantongshi Tongjiju 1993:86-7). Similarly, an 
increase in value from RMB 5.83 million to RMB 1110.21 million, or an 
increase of approximately 190 times, was recorded in Suzhou city (Suzhoushi 
Tongjiju 1989:59). 
7.2.2 Institutional Reform & the GTR in the Sunan Area 
Institutional reform of city-leading-counties in Jiangsu has induced great 






















































































































On the 1st of March 1983, Jiangsu had adopted the new regional 
administrative system. The prefectures of Suzhou, Nantong, Zhenjiang, 
Yangzhou, Xuzhou, Yancheng and Huaiyin were abolished. Counties led by 
them are now subordinated to the leading cities. In the Sunan Area, the 12 
counties formerly under the prefecture agencies of Suzhou, Nantong and 
Zhenjiang are now subordinated to Suzhou City, Wuxi City and Nantong City. 
Each leading city has their own city jurisdictions (see Fig. 7.2). 
The rural economic reform since 1978 has stimulated the rapid growth 
of rural industries in the Sunan Area. From 1978 to 1983, the area's gross 
value of industrial output of rural industries increased from RMB 2444.46 
million to RMB 6277.02 million, with an annual growth rate of 
During the same period, rural industries in Suzhou City, Wuxi City and 
Nantong City enjoyed the annual growth rates of 29.1%, 25.69% and 24.1%, 
respectively (see Fig. 7.3 to Fig. 7.5), while the annual growth rate of all 
industries in the three Cities were 21.73%, 13.31% and 13.44% respectively. 
The situation was the same for the whole Jiangsu province. 
The annual growth rate is calculated from data in Suzhoushi Tongjiju (1989:60), 
Wuxishi Tongjiju (1992:96) and Nantongshi Tongjiju (1993:95). 
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— city districts* (shiqu) 
Wuxi Jiangyin city 
City Yixing city 
(leading city) Wuxi county 
city districts* {shiqu) 
Changshu city 
Zhangjiagang city 
J画g s u Suzhou — Kunshan city 
Province City Taicang city 
(leading city) Wu county 
Wujiang county 
city districts* {shiqu) 
N a n t o n g _ Qidong city 
City Nantong county 
(leading city) Haimen county 
* The city district of Wuxi LC includes 5 districts {qu) of Beitang, 
Chongan, Mashan and sub-urban district (jiaoqu); Suzhou LC 
comprises of 4 districts of Canglang, Jinchang, Pingjiang and sub-
urban district; and Nantong LC consists of 2 districts of Chongchuan 
and Gangzha. 
Fig 7.2 The Administrative Hierarchy of City-Leading-Counties 
in the Sunan Area, 1993 
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Fig. 7.3 The Development of Rural Industries in Suzhou City, 
1978-82 
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Fig. 7.4. The Development of Rural Industries in Wuxi City, 
1978-1982. 
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Fig 7.5 The Development of Rural Industries in Nantong City, 
1978-1982 
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Source: Nantongshi Tongjiju (1993:95) 
The rapid growth of the rural industries in the Sunan Area had 
inevitably increased the demand for raw materials, energy resources, 
transportation facilities and other basic infrastructures. The great similarity in 
sectoral structure between the rural and the urban industries had worsened the 
situation. Based on 1985 data, Pei et al (1993:138) estimate that the similarity 
coefficient of Wuxi City's (urban) and Wuxi county's (rural) industrial 
structure was 0.9, i.e. a 90% similarity in both areas' industrial structure. Thus 
intensive competition was observed between the urban and the rural in aspects 
of energy sources, raw materials, capital, technology and skilled labour 
talents. The failure of establishing inter-regional (between the urban and the 
rural) horizontal linkages had urged the urban areas to introduce the 
administrative reform as a panacea. 
It is difficult to generalize the situation of horizontal linkages within 
the Sunan Area. Most of them are established between various enterprises or 
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sections or departments. For example, in Shegang village, their steel wire, 
reinforcing steel wire and steel screw industries have connection with those in 
Cangshu town, their leading town. Pei et al. (1993:140) show that a total of 
1650 rural enterprises have established horizontal connections in 1989, with 
1427 of them being connected to their leading cities. In Wuxi county, three 
months after being made subordinate to Wuxi City, an increase of 17.9% in 
the number of horizontal linkages with the latter was recorded (Pei et al 
1993:136). Inter-regional linkages, in the form of inter-county or city 
(especially inter-leading cities), are rare. It is the strong competition between 
the three leading cities and their led counties that has generated centrifugal 
forces against the establishment of such connections. Isolated by 
administrative boundaries, Wuxi LC and Suzhou LC, for instance, have 
developed their own industrial complexes and facilities of great similarity. 
Processing industries in both LCs account for over 80% of their gross values 
of industrial output. Textiles, chemicals and general machineries alone 
account for over 60% of these gross values (Fieldwork 1993). The keen 
competition has induced the similar export structures as well as industrial 
structures. In 1989, for example, the major exports of both Wuxi and Suzhou 
LCs were, light-textile commodities, heavy industrial commodities and 
agricultural sideline products. Moreover, cities compete among themselves 
and with counties for raw materials, markets, investments, skills and export 
quotas. The outcome is intensive competition and regional blockage rather 
than horizontal cooperation. 
Undoubtedly horizontal linkages between LCs are rare in the Sunan 
Area, but institutional reform has broken down the original mono-channel of 
resource transfer. Four new channels are formed for resource transfer in the 
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sphere of circulation. They are (1) trade between collectives; (2) personal and 
private trade; (3) private sale of industrial products; and (4) private sale from 
the peasants. Items (3) and (4) to some extent can be regarded as parts of 
items (1) and (2), respectively. The latter two items have developed rapidly in 
the Sunan Area. 
Strong evidences show that the linkages between the leading cities and 
their led counties, which did not exist before, are now "internalized" and take 
the "vertical" form. Take Wuxi LC as an example. In 1987, only about 10% of 
the necessary raw material such as coals, steels, cottons, timbers, chemical 
materials etc. were supplied by the state. The rest was satisfied 
administratively within her jurisdiction. Moreover, most scholars (for example 
Xia & Yang 1991) point out that most leading cities consider counties as their 
satellites and subordinate the latter's development to their master plans. 
Counties then become the backyards of the leading cities. Raw materials and 
agricultural products are extracted directly by the leading cities through 
various means. Inputs of foreign investment, redistribution of resources, bank 
credits and the quota of household registration reclassification {nong zhuan 
fei) are all controlled by the leading cities. Regarding the latter, for example, a 
total quota of 7000 was granted to Wuxi LC. While the leading city took up 
5737 of this total, leaving 440 to Jiangyin city, 420 to Yixing city and 405 to 
Wuxi county. Another example of "vertical" linkage is in the form of 
contribution to remittance. Once again take Wuxi LC as an illustration. Before 
the institutional reform, if the LC could not fulfill its fiscal target, it would be 
penalized; its allotted financial retainment would be cut by 10%. After the 
reform, the arrangement works against the three led cities and counties in that 
the portion of unfulfilled fiscal target has to be made up by them on a pro-rata 
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basis defined by their retainment ratios (Fieldwork, 1993). In other words, the 
led cities and counties have become worse off. 
The above discussion on the effects of the regional administrative 
reform on resource transfer can be illustrated schematically by Maps 7.3 to 
7.5. The latter, in comparison with Map 7.2, clearly show that the three 
leading cities have left the category of ’’losers" and begun to gain in the 
resource transfer. (A small exception is Nantong City, which, due to the lack 
of data on items and E2[, recorded a loss of RMB 77.2 million in 1991.) 
In contrast, the rest of the Sunan Area has suffered from resource loss 
continuously throughout the study period, and in increasing intensity. The 
message from these maps is loud and clear: while the leading cities have 
benefited from the regional administrative reform, their led cities/counties 
have suffered more seriously from it. 
Another point of interest is that the intensity of loss in resource is 
unequally distributed among the led counties and cities. In general, those 
counties/cities in closer proximity to their respective leading cities are the 
ones with the heaviest losses (see Map 7.2 to 7.5). Table 7.1 compares the 
heaviest loser in the three leading cities for the years of 1979，1986, 1990 and 
1991. It is apparent that Wu county, Wuxi county and Nantong county appear 
in the list all the times, with the exception of Wuxi county in 1986, when it 
was surpassed by Jiangyin county by a small margin of 1.5% (or 7.3 million). 
These three counties occupy locations that encircle the leading cities of 
Suzhou, Wuxi and Nantong City. Related to it is the fact that the amount of 
resource loss in these counties has increased over time. For Wuxi county, the 
figure has increased from RMB 132.6 millions in 1979, 463.7 millions in 



































































































































































































































































































































































increased from RMB 133.6 millions in 1979, 424.3 millions in 1986 to 631.7 
mimons in 1991. Finally, the increase for Nantong county has also been 
substantial: from RMB 190.5 millions in 1979, 341.7 millions in 1986 and 
442 millions in 1991 (see Table 6.6 to 6.9). 
Table 7.1 The County with the Heaviest Loss in Resource 
Within Each Leading City Region 
Year Wuxi LC Suzhou LC Nantong LC 
1979 Wuxi county Wu county Nantong county 
1986 Jiangyin county Wu county Nantong county 
1990 Wuxi county Wu county Nantong county 
1991 Wuxi county Wu county Nantong county 
Source: Tables 6.6-6.9 
This phenomenon induces us to think more seriously about the role of 
spatial structure in affecting the resource transfer. In the early 50s, the cities of 
Wuxi, Suzhou and Nantong had been established as the central places of Wuxi 
county, Wu county and Nantong county respectively, under the principle of 
"putting industries in the urban and agriculture in the rural". Put differently, 
each city was enclosed by its corresponding county and formed an "enclave" 
(see Fig. 7.6). For practical reasons, each city district was also empowered to 
be the county seat. This arrangement has kept intact even after the institutional 
reform in 1983. This arrangement is, however, more damaging from the 
perspective of the counties of Wuxi, Wu and Nantong. With the county 
governments subordinating to the LC governments, the three counties are now 
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treated as the immediate hinterlands of the leading cities. Their decisions on 
resources distribution, financial investment, revenue retainment etc. are 
usually intervened by the leading cities. Owing to the leading city's self-
interest, resource transfer may turn out to be more severe, as documented in 
Table 6.6 to 6.9. In short, the spatial structure of LCs helps to account for the 
spatial variation in the amount of resource loss. 
Leading city County seat of the 
encompassing county 
( cc^i^ty …似...‘ - J— 
other cJ^mities “ “ 
the LC jurisidiction 
Fig. 7.6 The Internal Spatial Structure of a Leading City 
in the Sunan Area 
Another piece of evidence to support this finding is the picture of 
resource localization. In fact, that the proportions of revenue expropriation in 
Sunan's cities and counties have decreased over time, provides an indication 
of the effect of regional administrative reform on resource transfer. In 1979, 
cities and counties remitted about 70% of their total revenues to the State (see 
Table 7.2). This figure dropped sharply in 1991, with, for instance, only about 
33% in both Kunshan county and Qidong city. Put differently, increasing 
proportions of locally generated resources are intercepted and appropriated by 
the leading city governments. 
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Table 7.2 Revenue Expropriation as a Proportion of the 
Total Revenues of Cities and Counties in The Sunan Area* 
City/county** 78 82 86 90 91 
Wuxi City 90.97 88.10 76.85 73.21 67.47 
Jiangyin city 82.87 83.15 74.03 70.63 66.16 
Yixing city 70.50 72.96 59.23 58.49 47.84 
Wuxi county 78.82 81.42 73.75 73.81 69.20 
Suzhou City 88.70 80.68 70.21 62.13 58.48 
Changsu city 82.89 85.16 72.59 68.10 61.03 
Zhangjiagang city 73.10 76.58 69.62 69.03 63.82 
Kunshan city 69.02 69.93 61.86 50.54 33.94 
Taicang county 73.56 78.44 70.10 63.59 52.50 
Wu county 71.06 81.43 68.54 65.22 55.33 
Wujiang county 74.76 76.81 68.98 64.61 55.92 
Nantong City 82.36 82.95 64.73 62.41 57.00 
Qidong city 62.96 59.38 49.17 45.34 33.48 
Nantong county 66.48 63.79 52.36 48.66 36.69 
Haimen county 70.69 60.84 49.66 44.00 37.94 
Note: * these ratios are calculated from data in Jiangsusheng Tongjiju 
(1989:437-44; 1991:451-2 and 1992:237-8). 
** these administrative divisions were applied to 1991 only 
By presenting these proportions in the form of resource localization, 
we can reinforce the argument that spatial structure does play a role in 
resource transfer. Figures 7.7 to 7.9 illustrate the amount of resource 
expropriated from the led cities/counties by the central city in each of the 
three leading cities. With the possible exception of Jiangyin in 1986, Wuxi 
county has been the unit that transmitted the largest amount of revenues to 
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Wuxi City. Similarly, Wu county and Nantong county are the ones that 
recorded the heaviest loss to Suzhou City and Nantong City, respectively. 
These figures therefore reinforce the argument that the county that encloses 
the central city usually suffers most in resource transfer. 
To summarize this section, the estimations of GTR and its resource 
localization in the Sunan Area have shown persuasively that there have been 
more resources transferred horizontally after the implementation of the 
regional administrative system. This system has also made those counties that 
enclose the central cities more vulnerable to the operation of the GTR 
mechanism, thereby contributing to a more serious loss in resource. 
Fig. 7.7 The Amount of GTR Expropriated From Different 
Cities & Counties in Wuxi LC 
450 T 
400-
RMB 350 • 
in million • • ！慨 
H U 
Jiangyin Yixing Wuxi 
Source: Table 6.11 
140 
Fig 7.8 The Amount of GTR Expropriated From Different 
Cities & Counties in Suzhou LC 
350 T ‘ 
300 - ra j m | l 
RMB 250 - | l _ • 
“ 1 1 - 200 ‘ | J | f | _ 
1 5 0 - P I I I I f | • 
liUiiM' 
Zhangjiagang Taicang Wujiang 
Changshu Kunshan Wu 
Source: Table 6.11 
Fig 7.9 The Amount of GTR Expropriated From Different 
Cities & Counties in Nantong LC* 
180 T ^ ^ 
160 - ^ P ， , 
RMB 140- • • 
in million 120 ^ B F W ^ 
100 -- • • • . • 1986 
-ill _ |i . 9 9 � 
iillM 
Qidong Nantong Haimen 
note: * 1991 data are missing 
Source: Table 6.11 
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7.3 GTR in the Sunan Rural Economy: A Discussion of The 
Mechanism 
This section, which focuses on mechanism responsible for the estimations 
discussed above, will be divided into two parts: while the former concentrates 
on the agricultural sector, the latter on the non-agricultural activities. Most of 
data and information were obtained from my fieldwork in the Sunan Area in 
1993. 
7-3.1 GTR in the Agricultural Sector 
The price mechanism is still one of the major mechanism of resource transfer 
in the Sunan Area. Take rice in Wu county as an example. In 1979, the State 
purchasing price of rice in Jiangsu was RMB 0.1 yuan per jin, while market 
price was about RMB 0.5 yuan per jin. Given that the output of rice was 0.58 
million tons (Wuxian Tongjijiu 1989:76) and that a price differential of RMB 
0.4 yuan existed, it meant that about RMB 232,000 yuan were transferred out 
of the rice sector. 
The various reform measures taken since then have not rendered the 
price mechanism less important. The purchasing price of rice was increased to 
RMB 0.2 yuan perym in 1985 and RMB 0.45 yuan per jin in 1992 in Jiangsu. 
According to the provincial government, the variance index of state 
purchasing price and market price has decreased from 1:1.48 in 1985 to 1:1.11 
in 1990 (Jiangsusheng Tongjiju & Jiangsusheng Nonglinting 1991:262). In 
1992, the province even abolished the system of unified purchased and unified 
sale. Nevertheless, the abolishment was of no virtual significance, and the 
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agricultural sector still accounts for a major part of the resource transfer. The 
double-track system, in which the State purchasing price for the portion of 
agricultural products under "contracts" and the negotiated price - barely the 
market price - for the rest, still provides the context for the transfer of 
resource. In 1992, for instance, Shegang village submitted 0.14 million 7m of 
rice and 12,0007m of silkworm cocoon to the State. If the purchasing price for 
rice was RMB 0.45 yuan perym and its market price was RMB 0.6 to 0.7 yuan 
per jin, Shegang village would have transferred approximately RMB 28,000 
y皿n via the price mechanism. Since the Sunan Area is the main food 
production center, resource transfer via this channel is bound to be dramatic. 
This is especially the case for agriculture-dominated villages such as Shegang 
and Xingfen village. 
One may object to this analysis on the grounds that Sunan's rural 
economy is dominated by non-agricultural activities. This being the case, one 
should, however, notice that as long as the price differential exists, an increase 
in agricultural input (due to an increase in production cost) still amounts to an 
increase in the amount of resources transferred outward. My study in Shegang 
village shows that an increase in input cost has almost wiped out the gains 
accrued from the increase in purchasing price. For Huang's family, a peasant 
household in the Shegang village, they obtained only RMB 300 yuan from the 
grains sold to the State, while paying RMB 210 yuan for the annual 
investment in cultivation. This left the family almost in red. Zhu's family, 
another household in Shegang village, shows a similar case. Income from the 
State purchase was RMB 150 yuan while their production cost reached RMB 
220 yuan. Both of them told me that the increase in input cost has made them 
unwilling to invest in cultivation. They have therefore transferred most of 
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their family members to the rural industries, and the paid salaries now 
dominates their family's total income. Concomitantly, grain cultivation has 
been transformed into one kind of sideline production. 
Huang and Zhu's case represent the dilemma faced by most peasant 
families in the Sunan Area. On the one hand, the increase in production cost 
has wiped out the gains from price increase and suppressed the peasants' 
incentive to cultivate. On the other hand, they cannot give up cultivation 
because they are required to fulfill the government's procurements. Most 
importantly, the increase in production cost has inevitably re-expanded the 
price gap, which had formerly been narrowed by the increase in purchasing 
price, as evidenced by the enlargement of the difference between the 
comparable price index of industrial and agricultural products {gangnong 
chanpin bijia) from 0.06 in 1985 to 0.25 in 1990 (Xiao 1993:38). A huge 
amount of rural resources from the agricultural sector is thus transferred 
outward via this channel. 
In the Sunan Area, the close relationship between rural industrial sector 
and agricultural sector presents another - a special one - route of resource 
flow. As noted earlier, rural industries in the Sunan Area are independent of 
their urban counterparts. The growth of these industries does not only make 
up the loss from the agricultural sector, but also provide great support to it. So 
the township and village enterprises have, instead of peasant households, 
become the major investors in the agricultural sector. In 1989, they invested a 
total of RMB 384.7 million in agricultural machinery, basic irrigation systems, 
advanced cultivation technology and other agricultural related activities. They 
accounted for about 33.3% of their total expenditures. In some cities, the 
percentage of investment even reached 62.7% (Nantong) and 61.3% (Yixing) 
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(see Table 7.3). An agricultural construction fund (jiannong jijin) has been 
established to support the agricultural activities, and it reached RMB 208.48 
million in 1989 and 258.02 million in 199028. 
The close relationship of the rural industrial activities and the 
agricultural activities in the Sunan Area has provided an useful means to 
specify the region's resource transfer. The heavy subsidy, especially in 
finance, to the agricultural activities by the rural industries represent an initial 
stage of resource transfer from the rural non-agricultural sector to the 
agricultural sector. Since resource transfer via differential price is still in 
operation, resources originally transmitted to the agricultural sector from the 
rural industrial sector are then leaked outward via this channel (see Fig. 7.10). 
Under this mechanism, more inputs amount to more resource leakage. 
in the form of 




• flow of resources 
Fig. 7.10 The Conceptual Diagram of Resource Transfer 
in Rural Sunan 
28 Data summed up from Jiangsusheng Tongjiju & Zhonggong Jiangsu Shengwei 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Various kinds of extra taxes and payments represent the third source of 
resource transfer in the Sunan Area. My study in Shegang village has 
identified a total of 27 items (Table 7.3). The exact number of item and the 
actual payment are difficult to survey. Most of them are levied on the 
township and village enterprises by various State ministries such as public 
security, communication, water conservancy and power, agriculture, forestry, 
public health, environmental protection, etc. The provincial, county and 
township governments also impose their own shares. The additional education 
payment (jiaoyu fujiafei) and the village administrative fee (xiang tong chou) 
are cases in point. The former is an additional fee for educational matters, 
including the construction of new schools and the upgrading of facilities. In 
1992, Cangshu town needed RMB 1.1 million for such purpose. While the 
State sponsored only 20% of the total cost, the rest had to be shared by her 18 
led villages. As a result, Shegang village submitted RMB 6,800 in 1992 and 
she would be required to submit a total of RMB 10,000 in 1993. The latter is a 
payment for village committees. Various villages usually have different 
amounts of payment and the per capita payment for Shegang village was 
RMB 60. Moreover, according to Mr. Zhu, the Party branch secretary of 
Shegang village, each CCP member has to donate a certain amount to the 
Party and the League. In 1992, for instance, each enterprise in Shegang village 
has donated about RMB 1,000 to 2,000, thereby adding up to a total of RMB 
10,000. 
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Table 7.4 Various Kinds of Exorbitant Levies 
in Rural Sunan 
Names of Payment* 
1 Identity Card 
2 Household Registration 
3 Transport Management by Gongan 
4 Traffic Accident Treatment 
5 Township Legal Service 
6 Labour Contract Apparition 
7 Labour Dispute Arbitration 
8 Safety & Sanitation Checking 
9 Mining Site Safety & Sanitation Checking 
10 Sea-route Transportation 
11 Water Charges for Water Conservancy 
12 Permeation & Examination Fee for Seeds 
13 Administrative Fee for Locally-Run Medical 
Institution 
14 Sanitary Control & Antiepidemic 
15 Hydrophobia Antiepidemic 
16 Sewage Disposal 
17 Extra-Sewage Disposal 
18 Marriage Registration Fee 
19 Road Maintenance 
20 Farm Machinery Control 
21 Administrative Fee for Township & Village 
Enterprise 
22 Road Transportation 
23 Country Fair Trade 
24 Administrative Fee for Individual Industrial & 
Commercial Merchants 
25 Registration Fee for Individual Industrial & 
Commercial Merchants 
26 Epidemic Prevention Payment for Domestic 
Poultry 
27 Quarantine Payment for Domestic Poultry & 
Products 
* All the names are translated by the author. 
Source: Fieldwork J993 
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7.丄 2 GTR in the Rural Non-Agricultural Activities 
It IS the growth of rural non-agricultural activities that induces another 
channel of resource transfer in the form of taxes. In Jiangsu, township and 
rural enterprises have overtaken the State-owned enterprises to become the 
mam value producer of industrial production and tax payer of rural economy. 
In 1978，gross output value of rural industries accounted for 18.7% of 
Jiangsu's gross value of industrial output. A decade later, the share increased 
to 45.5%. Their contribution of industrial and commercial tax to the total tax 
revenues increased from 53.23% in 1978 to 89% in 198829. The share even 
climbed to 93.37% in 1990 and 96.47% in 1991. 
Besides formal tax, exorbitant taxes and levies also plays an important 
role in resource transfer. Two cases will be quoted to illustrate the burden 
imposed. Mr. Gu's problem represents the one that most individual merchants 
usually face. He is the owner of a karaok club and restaurant in Mudu town, 
Wu county. Beside the main taxes, Mr. Gu needs to pay 15 types of incidental 
charges before starting his business. They are: (1) Administrative charges for 
individual industrial & commercial merchants; (2) Registration fee for 
individual industrial & commercial merchants; (3) Charges for sanitary 
permission; (4) Permission charges for cultural activities; (5) Payment for 
price examination; (6) Administrative charges for public security; (7) 
Registration and permission fees for air conditioning; (8) Donation for the 
Taihu development area; (9) Additional education fee; (10) Charges for 
transport management; (11) Payment for sanitary examination; (12) 
Additional payment for township construction; (13) Provision household 
29 Data from Jiangsusheng Tongjiju (1989:166); data shown here have been 
processed by the author. 
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registration fee and; (14) poll tax. All these cost Mr. Gu about RMB 17,000. 
Together with the industrial and commercial tax of RMB 2,000 per month and 
RMB 20,000 to 30,000 of "social expenditure", a total of about RMB 60,000 
is needed to pay to the related departments and ministries. 
The case of Viscose Plain Cloth (VPC) industry in Nantong LC shows 
another form of resource transfer in the rural non-agricultural sector. VPC, a 
major department of the textiles industry in the Sunan Area, accounts for 2/3 
of the country's total production. In 1993, there was a total of 946 enterprises 
subordinated to the Nantong Textiles Industry Bureau. Over 88% of them are 
township and village enterprise, while State owned and collective-run 
enterprises only accounted for 3.28% and 6.87%, respectively. 30 firms were 
involved in VPC production, and half of them were township and village 
enterprises. The latter accounted for 51% of the total VPC output value in 
Nantong. 
In this case, GTR is contributed by tax differential levied between 
township and village enterprises and State owned enterprises. VPC industry in 
Nantong has to pay four major taxes {dashui) and several minor taxes 
{xiaoshui). Major taxes include product tax, value-added tax, business tax and 
operation tax {yunzhuan shui). Minor taxes include income tax, regulation tax, 
urban maintenance and construction tax, bonus tax, State-run enterprises’ 
wage regulatory tax. Among the major taxes, product tax and value-added tax 
are the most important. Both are taxes on industrial and commercial activities 
but in different calculations. Product tax is imposed on the sale income of the 
production enterprises, while value-added tax is a tax imposed on newly 
created value in the process of production. In general, only one category of tax 
is imposed on a taxable item. For VPC (and other textiles products), product 
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tax was levied since 1984. According to the Ministry of Finance, value-added 
tax, instead of product tax, has become the only tax on VPC products since the 
first of January in 1986. However, Nantong's case exposes a different picture. 
Product tax is levied on the township and village enterprises, while value-
added tax is levied on State-run enterprise. Owing to the tax differential, the 
township and village enterprises are required to pay more tax than their 
counterparts (although both tax rates are 14%). In 1992，the gross output value 
of 101.99 million meter of VPC was worth RMB 3.5 billion. 51% of the latter, 
or RMB 1.785 billion, was contributed by the township and village 
enterprises, while the remaining 49%, or RMB 1.715 billion, was by State- & 
collective- owned enterprises. If product tax alone was levied, RMB 249.9 
million and RMB 164.5 million should be paid by the township and village 
enterprises and the State & collective enterprises, respectively. However, 
since value-added tax was levied on State- & collectively-owned enterprises, 
the township and village enterprises in fact were required to pay more tax-]�. 
The rapid development of rural non-agricultural activities has became 
the "golden mine" for local governments. The cases of Mr. Gu and of VPC 
industry have showed that both suffered from great loss in resources. Both 
cases also show that tax as a kind of resource transfer is obvious in the Sunan 
Area in the post-reform era. 
7.4 Conclusion 
30 Product tax is calculated by multiplying a product's sale revenue by the 
appropriate tax rate. Value-added tax, however, is calculated in different terms: (sale 
revenues - cost of raw material) x tax rate. For VPC, the tax rate is 14%. 
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The study of the Sunan Area has provided a good example for illustrating the 
actual operation of GTR and resource transfer. This chapter has shown that 
the price mechanism, the growth of rural non-agricultural activities, which are 
not subordinated to the urban industries, and the levy of extra taxes and 
payment by various levels of government are responsible for the continuous 
operation of the GTR and thus the transfer of resources after the 
implementation of the regional administrative system in the Sunan Area. The 
gain from the rural industries have been found smaller than the resources 
transferred out of the agricultural sector. Leakage still occurs via the 
agricultural sector. An additional channel of leakage has been found: from the 
rural non-agricultural sector to the agricultural sector and then to the urban 
areas. As a result, rural Sunan still suffers from resources leakage. Finally, 
the spatial structure is found important to affect resource transfer. The 
physical enclosure of the central city by a county has rendered that county the 




SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Summary 
This project has been concerned with the study of the mechanism underlying 
urban-rural inequality in the post-reform China. It involves the introduction of 
the concept of GTR, which has its roots in the socialist system. In other 
words，GTR mechanism is situated within the operation of the shortage 
economy and the practices of the socialist state apparatuses. As an analytical 
focus, GTR is not aimed at submerging other forces of unequal development. 
Rather, it is introduced to focus our attention on the socialist political 
economy and see how it influences the allocation of resources over space. 
Under the GTR mechanism, large amounts of rural resource are 
transferred to the urban areas, thereby contributing to the divergence between 
the urban and the rural. Resource transfer between the urban and the rural is 
affected by the way they interact. During the pre-reform period (1978 and 
before), when administrative (vertical) relationships between production units 
predominated the scene, only vertical transfers were in operation. Economic 
reform has broken down the mono-relationship between the urban and the 
rural by restoring their horizontal interactions. Thus, resource transfer 
operates via the horizontal channel too. While the vertical transfer is still in 
operation, the addition of horizontal transfer has led to a "dual transfer" of 
resources. Other things being equal, there are more rural resources transferred 
outward because the number of transfer channels has been increased. These 
channels include the circulation sphere and those manipulated by the State, 
such as taxes and various exorbitant levies. 
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The role of spatial relations in affecting resource transfer has also been 
considered in this study. The change in regional administrative system 
provides a good illustration. Institutional reform of city-leading-counties has 
altered not only the spatial structure but also the spatial distribution of 
economic and political powers. For the former, the discrete spatial structure 
which reproduced the separation between the urban and the rural is uprooted. 
Both the urban and the rural are now subordinated to one administrative unit, 
the leading city. For the latter, some of the economic powers originally 
resided with either the provincial government or prefecture agencies are now 
relegated to the prefecture-level city. In other words, economic powers have 
been localized. All these changes have influenced the operation, the direction 
and the magnitude of GTR. Accompanied with the localization of GTR is the 
tendency for more resources to be retained at the local level for local 
development. Moreover, under the new spatial context, the leading city 
governments have more power in directing local affairs. Accordingly, we have 
argued that more rural resources are now transferred to the urban areas (within 
the city jurisdiction). Conversely, the rural areas suffer more serious loss in 
resources, perhaps perpetuating the inequality between the urban and the rural. 
The concept of GTR has been operationalized to study resource 
transfer in the Sunan Area. In the application, characteristics of the Sunan 
Model have been considered to investigate the localized effects and its 
impacts on GTR and resource transfer. This case study has therefore dwelt on 
the context in which GTR operates, the forms of channel that it takes, the 
magnitude of the resources transferred and the spatial distribution of the 
recipients of resource gain and resource loss. It has found that the socio-
economic characteristics of the Sunan Area - favourable historical record, 
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economic prosperity, high level of rural industrialization, the dominance of 
collective ownership in the rural industrial sector and the intimate interaction 
between industry and agriculture - have shaped the operation of GTR and 
resource transfer. Thus, there are more resources being transferred from the 
rural to the urban. Besides, the close interaction between industry and 
agriculture has stimulated the transfer of resources, first, from the rural 
industry to the agriculture, and then, from the latter to urban industry. This is a 
new channel of transfer. Furthermore, the spatial enclosure of the central city 
by a county has rendered the latter the heaviest loser among all counties in the 
leading city region. Finally, the price mechanism and the levy of exorbitant 
taxes and payments are held responsible for the increasing outflows of 
resource from the rural. 
The case study of the Sunan Area is not without limitations, though. 
The insufficient availability of disaggregated data has constrained our 
estimations of resource transfer in several ways. First, only GTR^ and its 
localized amount are estimated; GTR2 cannot be estimated due to data 
problem. Second, much data in the rural commodity accounts are only average 
numbers due the lack of actual numbers for cities and counties. Third, owing 
to the inconsistency in statistical yardsticks and accounting methods, the 1979 
result of GTRi cannot be compared with those of 1986, 1990 and 1991. 
Finally, due to the scope of this study, which prohibits extensive fieldwork in 
all 15 cities and counties, we have to generalize the operation of GTR instead 
of unraveling the various channels and sources of resource transfer for 
different counties and cities. 
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8.2 Implications of the Study 
The above analysis of the urban-rural relationships has shown that the 
underlying mechanism leading to the urban-rural inequality in post-reform 
China is more complicated than we originally thought. Theoretically, neither 
the perspective of class-struggle nor the Soviet growth strategy can provide a 
satisfactory explanation of the issue. Hints can, however, be obtained from 
examining the intrinsic features of the planned economy. The resource 
constrained economy and the State-controlled society have forced both 
political and economic agents to respond in a designated way, which 
eventually leads to a geographic transfer of resources. The actual operation of 
such mechanism is, nevertheless, affected by the spatial contingent conditions 
of a particular area. In other words, it is difficult to deduce the actual 
operation of GTR mechanism in a locality, such as the Sunan Area, from 
reading the structural forces. 
The following implications for regional analysis in China can be drawn 
from our study. 
(1) China's urban-rural inequality is not simply the outcome of 
economic policies or development strategies, but also the product of the 
deeper structure of the socialist system. This provides a new direction to study 
China's regional issues. Accordingly, we need to interpret coastal/inland, 
inter-provincial, intra-urban and intra-rural inequalities in the context of the 
structural forces. 
(2) The forces that cause the urban-rural inequality come from the 
structure of the socialist system. But the spatial contingent effects and the 
locality effects have a role to play to affect the actual operation of the 
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structural forces. This implies that attention should be given to the spatial 
dimension of many development problems. Our study of the transfer of 
resource m the Sunan Area has shed some lights on this issue. The localization 
of the GTR mechanism and resource transferred imply a reinforcement of 
localism and regionalism. Intensive competition and conflicts have been 
induced by the changes in local governments' behaviour and action: from 
subordination to the benefits of the State to subordination to that of their own. 
Thus, the wealthy coastal areas, for instance, always argue for a higher 
detainment ratio for local revenues, while the inland areas adopt measures to 
protect their local industries, markets as well as raw materials. Economic 
behaviours of the local governments can no longer be completely controlled 
by the State. "The whole country as a plate of chess {quanguo yipan qiy is 
replaced by the prevalence of numerous plates of chess. Unless we pay heed 
to these different plates, it is difficult to understand exactly the local outcome 
of the operation of national and structural forces. 
(3) Urban-rural inequality in China cannot be solved by merely an 
economic reform. It seems that various reform measures have focused on the 
surface rather than the structure of the existing system. The institutional 
reform of city-leading-counties, for instance, attempts to narrow the urban-
rural gap via the reallocation of resource and power. The above study, 
however, demonstrates that the urban-rural inequality has been widened under 
the new system. The lopsidedness of China's economic reform has led to the 
emergence of new conflicts. Our study has shown that while vertical transfer 
of resources has been weakened by the institutional reform of city-leading-
counties, new channels have been established in the sphere of circulation 
creating new channels of resource transfer. Shortages (in resources) are thus 
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enforced in the rural areas. If counter-measures are to be effective, it requires 
a comprehensive reform of politics and institutions too. 
(4) Although some of our findings are based on the Sunan area only, 
we would still cast doubt on the idea of extending the system of city-leading-
coimties to the interior of the country. First, the rural economies of the interior 
are much less developed than their counterparts in the coast. Therefore, there 
are less resources around in the rural areas to make up the loss in resources 
induced by the implementation of the system. In other words, the rural areas 
will suffer more due to resource transfer. Second, the rationale of the system 
is to deploy the "central city" function of the leading city to induce growth to 
its surrounding hinterland. But cities in the interior, with growth induced more 
from outside than from internal, have more contacts with other cities in the 
coast than with their immediate hinterlands. Thus, the implementation of the 
system will result in polarization rather than spread effect. The final outcome 
will be the widening of urban-rural inequality at the local level and of uneven 
development between the coast and the interior at the regional level. Based on 
these preliminary conclusions, we would not recommend to extend the system 
of city-leading-counties to the interior. 
8.3 Directions for Further Research 
In this study, we have managed to point out that the important role of 
government authorities (either the State, local governments or other 
governmental departments) on the GTR mechanism as well as resource 
reallocation. However, various aspects concerning these authorities have not 
been fully analyzed. Continuous reform measures in the late 80s and early 90s 
158 
have further strengthened the power of local authorities. Their influences on 
local affairs have been increased. Accordingly, how do these authorities 
influence rural resource transfers can only be understood with a better 
informed account of their politics. This includes an understanding of the 
actions and policies of local authorities, the control and counter-control 
mechanisms between the State and the local authorities and between the State 
and the society, etc. 
The findings of this study can be further elaborated by applying the 
concept of GTR to other areas and provinces. This study has fulfilled our 
objective of identifying the underlying mechanism that contributes to China's 
urban-rural inequality. But due to its limited scope, only the Sunan Area has 
been used to elaborate this mechanism. It is imperative to further elaborate the 
concept to other regions of admirable rural development such as Wenzhou, 
Fuyang, Gengche, Jinjiang and Jinhua, etc.^i. In doing so, we would be in a 
much better position to see how local economic characteristics can affect 
inter-regional resource transfer and thus urban-rural inequality. Likewise, it is 
also worthwhile applying the concept to inland provinces so that comparisons 
can be made between the coastal regions and the inland provinces. These 
attempts, in totality, will provide us a more complete picture of the role of 
spatial differentiation and locality effect in affecting the operation of the 
mechanism underlying urban-rural inequality in post-reform China. 
31 Each of these regions is famous for its particular form of rural development. For 
instance, the Wenzhou model is famous for its small-scale, household-based 
economy; the Gengche model for its high degree of public ownership together with 
its processing industry of primary products; and the Jinjiang model for its small 
scale, high degree of specialization and export orientation. 
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